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PREVENTING RECURRENCES OF THE 
COVER-UPS AT PENN STATE & BAYLOR 
(AND NOW MICHIGAN STATE): WHERE 
DOES IT END? 
 
ANDREW SOLOMON* 
 
In recent years, several high-profile sexual assault and abuse scandals have 
rocked the collegiate athletic world and forced university officials to reexamine 
their legal and moral responsibilities after learning about potential criminal  
activity on campus.  In several scandals, ranging from Pennsylvania State  
University (Penn State) to Baylor University to more recently Michigan State 
University, high-level officials from prestigious universities knew about  
allegations of potential sexual assaults and did not take the allegations as  
seriously as needed.  Other prestigious organizations, including the Catholic 
Church, have encountered similar problems, but this Article focuses on  
universities generally, and their athletic departments specifically.1   
The most high profile case occurred at Penn State where former assistant 
football coach, Gerald (Jerry) Sandusky, was ultimately convicted of  
forty-five counts of sexual abuse for his serial sexual molestation of children.2  
 
* Andrew Solomon is a Professor of Law at South Texas College of Law Houston where he teaches, 
advises the Sport and Entertainment Law Society, and coaches Little League baseball in Pearland, Texas.  He 
earned his J.D. from Boston University School of Law (1990) and his B.A. in Economics from the University 
of Michigan (1987).  He thanks his colleagues at South Texas College of Law Houston for being inspirational 
teachers and scholars, and his wife (Mary Ann) and children (Samantha and Alex) for providing meaning to 
his life.  
1. Although this Article focuses on college athletics, there are parallels between the scandals at  
universities and the cover-up by the Catholic Church.  Penn State head football coach, Joe Paterno, and Baylor 
head football coach, Art Briles, like some Church leaders, seemingly looked the other way because they were 
protecting their universities and reputations rather than the innocent victims.  Other coaches, like others in the 
Church, looked the other way and put their careers in front of innocent victims because they knew it was what 
the hierarchy wanted.  In totality, both Penn State and Baylor’s administrations, similar to the Vatican, put 
their schools and football teams before innocent victims.  In both cases, innocent victims were abused and let 
down by trustworthy leaders.  Even today, some Penn State and Baylor loyalists continue to make excuses 
and remain blinded by their loyalty and faith in the institutions.   
2. CNN Wire Staff, Jury Finds Jerry Sandusky Guilty on Dozens of Child Sex Abuse Charges, CNN (June 
23, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/22/justice/pennsylvania-sandusky-trial/ (noting that after  
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Sandusky’s crimes were heinous in nature, but perhaps even more shocking was 
the revelation that several high-level Penn State University and athletic  
department officials, including legendary head football coach, Joe Paterno,  
either witnessed or learned about the potential abuse and took inadequate steps 
to properly investigate, report, or stop the abuse.  An independent investigation 
into the Penn State situation, conducted by former Federal Bureau of  
Investigation (FBI) Director Louis Freeh’s law firm,3 ultimately found that: 
[f]our of the most powerful people at The Pennsylvania State 
University—President Graham B. Spanier, Senior Vice  
President-Finance and Business Gary C. Schultz, Athletic  
Director Timothy M. Curley and Head Football Coach Joseph 
V. Paterno—failed to protect against a child sexual predator 
harming children for over a decade.  These men concealed 
Sandusky’s activities from the Board of Trustees, the  
University community and authorities.  They exhibited a  
striking lack of empathy for Sandusky’s victims . . . .4   
More recently, evidence suggests that the cover-up may not have lasted ten 
years, but up to forty years.5  The scandal ultimately led to the firing of Penn 
State’s president, vice president, athletic director, and head football coach, Joe 
 
deliberating for twenty-one hours, jurors convicted Sandusky on forty-five counts related to his sexual abuse 
of ten boys over a fifteen-year period). 
3. FREEH SPORKIN & SULLIVAN, LLP, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL REGARDING 
THE ACTIONS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY RELATED TO THE CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 
COMMITTED BY GERALD A. SANDUSKY (GEO. L. LIBR. 2012), available at 
http://cdm266901.cdmhost.com/cdm/ref/collection/p266901coll4/id/3983.  According to the introduction, 
Freeh Sporkin & Sullivan, LLP, (“FSS”), was engaged by the Special Investigations Task 
Force (“Task Force”) on behalf of The Pennsylvania State University’s Board of Trustees 
(“Board” or “Trustees”) as Special Investigative Counsel on November 21, 2011.  As  
Special Investigative Counsel, FSS was asked to perform an independent, full and  
complete investigation of:   
(1) The alleged failure of Pennsylvania State University personnel to respond to, and 
report to the appropriate authorities, the sexual abuse of children by former  
University football coach Gerald A. Sandusky (“Sandusky”); 
(2) The circumstances under which such abuse could occur in University facilities or 
under the auspices of University programs for youth.   
In addition, the Special Investigative Counsel was asked to provide recommendations  
regarding University governance, oversight, and administrative policies and procedures 
that will better enable the University to prevent and more effectively respond to incidents 
of sexual abuse of minors in the future. 
Id. at 8. 
4. Id. at 14. 
5. See infra Part I (detailing recent evidence showing that Paterno and others possibly knew about 
Sandusky’s problems in the 1970s). 
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Paterno.  It also led to the filing of numerous civil lawsuits against Penn State, 
and criminal convictions of top university leaders. 
Even though the Penn State scandal sent shockwaves across the nation and 
caused universities to reconsider the reporting of possible criminal activity and 
sexual assaults, Baylor University officials and football coaches recently failed 
to adequately investigate and report numerous sexual assaults committed by 
football players.6  An independent investigation into the Baylor situation,  
conducted by the Pepper Hamilton law firm,7 concluded that “[t]he choices 
made by the football staff and athletics leadership . . . posed a risk to campus 
safety and the integrity of the University.”8  More specifically, high-level Baylor 
officials failed to “identify and respond to a pattern of sexual violence . . . [and] 
to take action in response to reports of a sexual assault by multiple football  
players . . . .”9  After the release of the Pepper Hamilton report, Baylor Board of 
Regents Chair, Richard Willis, stated, “[w]e were horrified by the extent of 
these acts of sexual violence on our campus . . . . This investigation revealed the 
University’s mishandling of reports in what should have been a supportive,  
responsive and caring environment for students.”10  The scandal ultimately led 
to the firing of Baylor University’s Chancellor, Kenneth Starr, head football 
coach, Art Briles, and several other Baylor officials.  It also led to numerous 
lawsuits against Baylor University. 
Although the Penn State and Baylor scandals are the two most egregious 
examples of significant problems within universities and their athletic  
departments (at least until the recent scandal at Michigan State University),  
several other universities have encountered similar problems.11  For example, in 
 
6. Timeline: Baylor Sexual Assault Controversy, WACO TRIB.-HERALD, Jan. 1, 2017, 
https://www.wacotrib.com/news/higher_education/timeline-baylor-sexual-assault-controversy/arti-
cle_abf21ab8-2267-51bf-84d8-6268f4222af0.html. 
7. BAYLOR UNIV., BAYLOR UNIV. BD. OF REGENTS FINDINGS OF FACT 1 (2016), available at 
http://www.baylor.edu/rtsv/doc.php/266596.pdf.http://www.baylor.edu/rtsv/doc.php/266596.pdf. The  
Pepper Hamilton law firm did not release a final report, but Baylor University’s Board of Regents issued 
findings of fact.  Id.   
8. Id. at 10. 
9. Id. at 2. 
10. Edwin Rios & Madison Pauly, Read the Damning Report on How Baylor Failed to Address Sexual 
Assault by Its Football Players, MOTHER JONES (May 26, 2016), http://www.motherjones.com/poli-
tics/2016/05/baylor-football-sexual-assaults-damning-report-ken-starr. 
11. See generally Paul Bowers, The Citadel’s Failure to Act Has Tarnished Its Reputation, CHARLESTON 
CITY PAPER, Nov. 23, 2011), http://www.charlestoncitypaper.com/charleston/the-citadels-failure-to-act-has-
tarnished-its-reputation/Content?oid=3648975.  Other educational institutions have also been the subject of 
sexual abuse scandals.  Id.  The Citadel, a military college in Charleston, South Carolina, came under fire for 
failing to report the sexual abuse of several children by a former summer camp counselor who was an alumnus 
of the college.  Id.  In 2007, the school investigated allegations, but ultimately dropped the investigation and 
did not report it to police.  Id.  See generally Eric Prisbell, Syracuse Report Offers Criticism of Bernie Fine 
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June 2016, the University of Tennessee paid $2.48 million to settle a Title IX 
lawsuit brought by eight female students who alleged that the university had a 
policy of indifference toward sexual assaults committed by its athletes, and 
thereby created a hostile sexual environment for female students.12  More  
specifically, the students claimed that the University of Tennessee had created 
a culture that enabled sexual assaults by student-athletes, especially football 
players, and the university was biased against victims who stepped forward.13  
Each of these scandals have exposed a significant problem within universities 
and athletic departments, and sparked a debate about how to prevent future  
recurrences. 
This article examines the recent failures by athletic department and  
university officials to properly investigate and report allegations of criminal 
conduct.  In addressing this problem, the article focuses on the Penn State and 
Baylor scandals, some of the relevant state and federal law, and the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association’s (NCAA) role.  The article’s first section  
details the specifics of the “failure to investigate and report” scandals at Penn 
State and Baylor.  The second section examines some of the applicable state and 
federal laws, which obligate the reporting of campus criminal activity, most  
notably sexual assault and abuse.  The third section examines the NCAA’s role 
in regulating and punishing universities that engage in illegal and immoral  
conduct showing a lack of institutional control.  Finally, the fourth section takes 
a brief look into the recent Michigan State scandal and recommends steps for 
improving laws and other measures that will prevent future recurrences, provide 
better protection for students, and help to avoid university liability. 
I. THE PENN STATE AND BAYLOR SCANDALS 
Although the scandals at Penn State and Baylor are not the only examples 
of organizations or universities failing to properly investigate and report, and 
possibly covering-up criminal activity and sexual abuse, this Article focuses on 
 
Investigation, USA TODAY, July 5, 2012, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/mensbasketball/bi-
geast/story/2012-07-05/syracuse-findings-bernie-fine-investigation/56041250/1.  In another incident, several 
men accused Syracuse University Assistant Basketball Coach Bernie Fine of sexual abuse that occurred when 
they were ball boys for the school’s basketball team.  Id.  Although Syracuse University investigated these 
allegations in 2005, neither the university nor the police found enough evidence to discipline or charge Coach 
Fine.  Id.  However, in 2012, after the release of an audiotape in which Fine’s wife seemingly acknowledged 
her husband’s role in the abuse, Coach Fine was immediately fired.  Id.   
12. Nate Rau & Anita Wadhwani, Tennessee Settles Sexual Assault Suit for $2.48 Million, TENNESSEAN, 
July 6, 2016, http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/crime/2016/07/05/tennessee-settles-sexual-assault-suit-
248-million/86708442/. 
13. Anita Wadhwani & Nate Rau, Sweeping Sex Assault Suit Filed Against University of Tennessee, 
TENNESSEAN, Feb. 24, 2016, http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/2016/02/09/sweeping-sexual-assault-
suit-filed-against-ut/79966450/. 
SOLOMON - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/4/18  6:21 PM 
2018]  PREVENTING COVER-UPS IN COLLEGE ATHLETICS  383 
these two high-profile scandals to illustrate the depth of potential problems on 
collegiate campuses. 
A. The Penn State Scandal 
“This is a tragedy.  It is one of the great sorrows of my life. 
With the benefit of hindsight, I wish I had done more.”14 – 
Coach Joe Paterno  
 
In November 2011, a Pennsylvania grand jury report detailed how former 
Penn State assistant football coach, Jerry Sandusky, had sexually assaulted eight 
young boys in the Penn State locker rooms and elsewhere over a period of  
approximately fifteen years (from 1994 to 2009).15  Sandusky was ultimately 
convicted on forty-five counts of sexual abuse, including rape and sodomy, of 
ten teenage boys who Sandusky had groomed and sexually abused in and around 
the locker room of the school’s hallowed football stadium.16  Perhaps even more 
shocking than the serial sexual abuse by the former football coach was the 
cover-up or inadequate investigation and reporting by athletic and university 
officials who seemingly deemed the sanctity of Penn State and its football  
program to be more important than preventing the recurrence of future sexual 
abuse or justice for the victims.   
According to the grand jury report, Penn State staff members witnessed  
inappropriate conduct between Sandusky and a number of young boys on  
several occasions and these staff members notified their university supervisors, 
but did not notify the police or child protective services agencies.17  In the most 
 
14. Mark Memmott, Penn State Coach Paterno to Retire, Says ‘I Wish I Had Done More’, NPR: THE 
TWO-WAY (Nov. 9, 2011, 10:43 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2011/11/09/142171189/son-
says-penn-state-coach-paterno-will-retire-at-end-of-season. 
15. See GRAND JURY REPORT ON ALLEGED PENN STATE SEX ABUSE (2011), http://www.document-
cloud.org/documents/264894-sandusky-grand-jury-presentment.html.  On November 4, 2011, the grand jury 
report detailed explicit testimony that former Penn State Defensive Coordinator Jerry Sandusky sexually 
abused eight young boys over a period of at least fifteen years.  Id.  On December 7, 2011, the number of 
victims increased from eight to ten.  Id.   
16. See Joe Drape, Penn State’s Sandusky Convicted of Sexually Abusing Boys, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/23/sports/ncaafootball/jerry-sandusky-convicted-of-sexually-abus-
ing-boys.html.  On June 22, 2012, after a two-week trial, a jury convicted Sandusky, sixty-eight, of sexually 
assaulting ten boys, all from disadvantaged homes, whom Sandusky had befriended often using his access to 
Penn State’s vaunted football program.  Id.  During the trial, eight men offered graphic testimony about  
repeated rapes and sexual assaults by Sandusky — on the Penn State campus, in hotel rooms, and in the 
basement of Sandusky’s home.  Id. 
17. See GRAND JURY REPORT ON ALLEGED PENN STATE SEX ABUSE, supra note 15, at 10.  The Grand 
Jury Report showed that two Penn State officials — Athletic Director, Tim Curley, and Vice President, Gary 
Schultz — purportedly failed to notify law enforcement after learning about some of these sexual assault 
incidents, and they were subsequently charged with perjury and failing to report suspected child abuse.  Id.  
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egregious example detailed in the grand jury report, graduate assistant football 
coach, Mike McQueary, after returning to the Penn State locker room at night 
in 2002, heard sounds in a shower and saw a ten-year-old boy “with his hands 
up against the wall, being subjected to anal intercourse by a naked Sandusky.”18  
Although assistant coach McQueary did not intervene, on the next morning, he 
visited head football coach, Joe Paterno, and reported that Sandusky was  
“fondling or doing something of a sexual nature to a young boy.”19  On the next 
day, instead of notifying the police, Coach Paterno reported the incident to Penn 
State Athletic Director (“AD”), Tim Curley.20 Approximately ten days later, AD 
Curley and the Senior Vice President (“VP”), Gary Schultz, met with graduate 
assistant coach, McQueary, and promised to “look into” the incident.21  Two 
weeks later, AD Curley told McQueary that Sandusky’s keys to the locker room 
had been taken away and the incident had been reported to the Second Mile 
charity, an organization for disadvantaged youth run by Sandusky.22  The 
 
Penn State President, Graham Spanier, was also subsequently charged with “failure to report” and “child 
endangerment.”  Id.   
18. Id. at 6–7. 
As the graduate assistant entered the locker room doors, he was surprised to find the lights 
and showers on.  He then heard rhythmic, slapping sounds.  He believed the sounds to be 
those of sexual activity.  As the graduate assistant put the sneakers in his locker, he looked 
into the shower.  He saw a naked boy, Victim 2, whose age he estimated to be ten years 
old, with his hands up against the wall, being subjected to anal intercourse by a naked 
Sandusky.  The graduate assistant was shocked but noticed that both Victim 2 and Sandusky 
saw him.  The graduate assistant left immediately, distraught. 
19. Id. at 7. 
Paterno called Tim Curley (“Curley”), Penn State Athletic Director and Paterno’s  
immediate superior, to his home the very next day, a Sunday, and reported to him that the 
graduate assistant had seen Jerry Sandusky in the Lasch Building showers fondling or doing 
something of a sexual nature to a young boy. 
20. Id.   
Joseph V. Paterno testified to receiving the graduate assistant’s report at his home on a 
Saturday morning.  Paterno testified that the graduate assistant was very upset. Paterno 
called Tim Curley (“Curley”), Penn State Athletic Director and Paterno’s immediate  
superior, to his home the very next day, a Sunday, and reported to him that the graduate 
assistant had seen Jerry Sandusky in the Lasch Building showers fondling or doing  
something of a sexual nature to a young boy. 
21. Id. 
Approximately one and a half weeks later, the graduate assistant was called to a meeting 
with Penn State Athletic Director Curley and Senior Vice President for Finance and  
Business Gary Schultz (“Schultz”).  The graduate assistant reported to Curley and Schultz 
that he had witnessed what he believed to be Sandusky having anal sex with a boy in the 
Lasch Building showers.  Curley and Schultz assured the graduate assistant that they would 
look into it and determine what further action they would take.  Paterno was not present for 
this meeting. 
22. GRAND JURY REPORT ON ALLEGED PENN STATE SEX ABUSE, supra note 15, at 7–8. 
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incident observed and reported by graduate assistant coach McQueary was 
never reported to the police or child protection services.  AD Curley told the 
grand jury that he reported the incident to Penn State President, Graham Spanier, 
but not the authorities because the allegation was “not sexual of any kind” but 
only “horsing around.”23  Senior VP Schultz also told the grand jury that  
graduate assistant coach, McQueary, reported “inappropriate sexual conduct,” 
but it was “not that serious” nor criminal.24 
Shortly after the release of the grand jury report, AD Tim Curley and Senior 
VP Gary Schultz were both deemed blameworthy and were immediately 
charged with failing to report sexual abuse to police as required by Pennsylvania 
law.25  Less than one week after the release of the Sandusky grand jury findings, 
Penn State President, Graham Spanier, was fired because he failed to take  
precautionary steps after being made aware of the Sandusky incidents; he was 
 
The graduate assistant heard back from Curley a couple of weeks later.  He was told that 
Sandusky’s keys to the locker room were taken away and that the incident had been  
reported to The Second Mile.  The graduate assistant was never questioned by University 
Police and no other entity conducted an investigation until he testified in Grand Jury in 
December, 2010.  The Grand Jury finds the graduate assistant’s testimony to be extremely 
credible. 
23. Id. at 8. 
Curley specifically denied that the graduate assistant reported anal sex or anything of a 
sexual nature whatsoever and termed the conduct as merely “horsing around.”  When asked 
whether the graduate assistant had reported “sexual conduct” “of any kind” by Sandusky, 
Curley answered, “No” twice.  When asked if the graduate assistant had reported “anal sex 
between Jerry Sandusky and this child,” Curley testified, “Absolutely not.” 
24. Id. at 8–9. 
Schultz testified that he was called to a meeting with Joe Paterno and Tim Curley, in which 
Paterno reported “disturbing” and “inappropriate” conduct in the shower by Sandusky upon 
a young boy, as reported to him by a student or graduate student.  Schultz was present in a 
subsequent meeting with Curley when the graduate assistant reported the incident in the 
shower involving Sandusky and a boy.  Schultz was very unsure about what he remembered 
the graduate assistant telling him and Curley about the shower incident.  He testified that 
he had the impression that Sandusky might have inappropriately grabbed the young boy’s 
genitals while wrestling and agreed that such was inappropriate sexual conduct between a 
man and a boy.  While equivocating on the definition of “sexual” in the context of Sandusky 
wrestling with and grabbing the genitals of the boy, Schultz conceded that the report the 
graduate assistant made was of inappropriate sexual conduct by Sandusky.  However, 
Schultz testified that the allegations were “not that serious” and that he and Curley “had no 
indication that a crime had occurred.”  Schultz agreed that sodomy between Sandusky and 
a child would clearly be inappropriate sexual conduct.  He denied having such conduct 
reported to him either by Paterno or the graduate assistant. 
25. Kate Giammarise, Penn State’s Spanier, Curley and Schultz to Stand Trial on All Charges in 
Sandusky Case, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, July 30, 2013, http://www.post-ga-
zette.com/news/state/2013/07/30/Penn-State-s-Spanier-Curley-and-Schultz-to-stand-trial-on-all-charges-in-
Sandusky-case/stories/201307300204.  In addition to being charged with failing to report the possible abuse 
of a child, AD Curley and VP Schultz were charged with making false statements to the grand jury.  Id.   
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later also charged with failing to report after initially not being charged  
criminally.26  At the same time, longtime head football coach, Joe Paterno, who 
was also made aware of the sexual incident and reported it to his supervisors but 
did not take any other action to fully investigate or ultimately stop the abuse, 
was fired by Penn State; he was not charged criminally and died less than three 
months later.27  Pennsylvania State Police Commissioner, Frank Noonan, who 
admitted that Paterno likely met his legal requirement under Pennsylvania law 
by reporting the abuse to his superiors, chastised Paterno for not calling and 
notifying the police.28  Because of the nature of the allegations, the Police  
Commissioner thought, “[w]hether you’re a football coach or a university  
president or the guy sweeping the building, . . . I think you have a moral  
responsibility to call us.”29   
Although the failure to report the 2002 shower incident detailed in the grand 
jury report is troubling, these same Penn State officials apparently knew about 
Sandusky’s sexual abuse for a longer period of time.  According to an  
eight-month independent investigation into the sex abuse scandal,  
commissioned by Penn State and conducted by former FBI Director Louis 
Freeh, “several staff members and football coaches regularly observed 
Sandusky showering with young boys” in the Penn State football building as 
early as 1998.30  In 1998, police investigated a mother’s report that Sandusky 
showered with her eleven-year-old son on the Penn State campus.31  The  
University police notified VP Schultz of the investigation, who subsequently 
notified President Spanier and AD Curley.32  VP Schultz’s handwritten notes on 
 
26. Bill Chappell, The Penn State Child Abuse Scandal: A Guide And Timeline, NPR (June 21, 2012), 
http://www.npr.org/2011/11/08/142111804/penn-state-abuse-scandal-a-guide-and-timeline. 
27. Id. 
28. John L. Micek & Peter Hall, Penn State, Paterno: Pennsylvania’s Police Commissioner Says Penn 
State and Joe Paterno Didn’t Do Enough to Stop the Alleged Sexual Abuse of Children By a Former Assistant 
Football Coach, MORNING CALL, Nov. 8, 2011, http://www.mcall.com/news/local/mc-penn-state-sandusky-
charges-20111108-story.html. 
29. Id. 
30. FREEH SPORKIN & SULLIVAN, LLP, supra note 3, at 39-40.  “Before May 1998, several staff members 
and football coaches regularly observed Sandusky showering with young boys in the Lasch Building (now 
the East Area Locker Building or “Old Lasch”).  None of the individuals interviewed notified their superiors 
of this behavior.”  Id. at 39.  “Former Coach Richard Anderson testified at Sandusky’s trial in June 2012 that 
he often saw Sandusky in the showers with children in the football facilities but he did not believe the practice 
to be improper.”  Id.  at 40. 
31. Id. at 20.  “Victim 6’s mother reports to the University Police Department that Sandusky showered 
with her 11-year old son in the Lasch Building on Penn State campus.  The police promptly begin an  
investigation.”  Id.   
32. Id.  “Schultz is immediately informed of the investigation and notifies Spanier and Curley.  Schultz’s 
confidential May 4, 1998 notes about Sandusky state: ‘Behavior—at best inappropriate @ worst sexual  
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the incident describe Sandusky’s behavior as “at best inappropriate,” “at worst 
sexual improprieties,” and “at [a] minimum poor judgment.”33  VP Schultz’s 
notes also wondered whether this was “opening Pandora’s box” and whether 
“other children” were involved.34  The investigation also showed that AD 
Curley “touched base with” Coach Paterno about the 1998 incident who was 
“anxious to know where it stands.”35  During the investigation, Sandusky  
admitted, “hugging” the boy in the shower and having “done this with other 
children in the past.”36  Although a detective advised Sandusky “not to shower 
with any child,”37 Penn State’s Police Chief ultimately found a “lack of clear 
evidence of a crime” and the District Attorney declined to bring charges.38   
Despite their knowledge of the criminal investigation, President Spanier, VP 
Schultz, AD Curley, and coach Paterno never spoke to Sandusky about his  
conduct or took measures to adequately protect children on Penn State’s  
campus.39 
The Freeh Report ultimately concluded that Paterno and Penn State’s  
leadership had displayed a “callous and shocking disregard for child victims” 
and “failed to protect against a child sexual predator harming children for over 
 
improprieties’ and ‘At min—Poor Judgment.’  Schultz also notes: ‘Is this opening of pandora’s box?’ and 
‘Other children?’”  Id.   
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. FREEH SPORKIN & SULLIVAN, LLP, supra note 3, at 20.  “[AD] Curley notifie[d] [VP] Schultz and 
[President] Spanier that he has ‘touched base with’ Paterno about the incident.  Days later, Curley emails 
Schultz: ‘Anything new in this department? Coach is anxious to know where it stands.’”  Id.   
36. Id.   
University Police detective and Department of Public Welfare caseworker interview[ed] 
Sandusky [who] . . . admit[ted] . . . hugging Victim 6 in the shower but says there was  
nothing ‘sexual about it . . . .  Harmon emails [VP] Schultz: officers ‘met discreetly’ with 
Sandusky and ‘his account of the matter was essentially the same as the child’s.’ Sandusky 
said, ‘he had done this with other children in the past.  Sandusky was advised that there was 
no criminal behavior established and that the matter was closed as an investigation.’ 
37. Id. at 39. (“The detective advised Sandusky not to shower with any child and Sandusky said he 
‘wouldn’t.’”). 
38. Id. at 20.  “University Police Department Chief Harmon emails Schultz: ‘We’re going to hold off on 
making any crime log entry.  At this point in time I can justify that decision because of the lack of clear 
evidence of a crime.’  [D]istrict Attorney declines to bring charges against Sandusky.”  Id.  “The District 
Attorney at the time of the 1998 incident has been missing for several years and has been declared dead.”  Id. 
at 46.   
39. Id. at 39.   
Spanier, Schultz, Paterno and Curley did not even speak to Sandusky about his conduct on 
May 3, 1998 in the Lasch Building.  Despite their knowledge of the criminal investigation 
of Sandusky, Spanier, Schultz, Paterno and Curley took no action to limit Sandusky’s  
access to Penn State facilities or took any measures to protect children on their campuses.   
Id. In 1999, less than one year after this incident and after twenty years as Paterno’s defensive coordinator, 
Sandusky retired.  Id. at 40. 
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a decade.”40  More specifically, it concluded that for over fourteen years, from 
1998 to 2011, “the most powerful leaders at [Penn State] University — Spanier, 
Schultz, Paterno and Curley — repeatedly concealed critical facts relating to 
Sandusky’s child abuse from the authorities, the . . . Board of Trustees, Penn 
State community, and the public at large.”41  The Report found a “total and  
consistent disregard by the most senior leaders at Penn State for the safety and 
welfare of Sandusky’s child victims.”42  According to the Report, even with 
knowledge about the 1998 investigation, President Graham Spanier approved a 
decision by AD Curley to not report Sandusky in 2002 after the incident  
witnessed by graduate assistant coach McQueary.  The Report shows that emails 
allegedly exchanged between President Spanier, AD Curley and VP Schultz 
suggest that a conversation between AD Curley and coach Paterno may have 
altered a plan to report Sandusky to the Department of Welfare.43  By failing to 
report these allegations, these Penn State officials placed the reputation of Penn 
State ahead of the harm that Sandusky did to young boys for the next ten years, 
from 2002 to 2012.  After the release of the Freeh Report, Penn State’s Board 
of Trustees took “full responsibility” for not stopping Jerry Sandusky from  
sexually abusing children, and stated: 
“We are accountable for what’s happened here. . . .  People who were in a 
position to protect children and to confront a predator . . . did not put the welfare 
of children first . . . .  Our hearts remain heavy and deeply ashamed.”44 
After the release of the Freeh Report, the Penn State scandal evolved further 
after evidence emerged that the Sandusky incidents did not start in 1998, but 
possibly as early as 1971 when Sandusky allegedly sexually abused a  
 
40. FREEH SPORKIN & SULLIVAN, LLP, supra note 3, at 14. 
41. Id. at 16. 
42. Id. at 14. 
43. Id. at 24. 
Curley emails Schultz and Spanier and says he [Curley] has changed his mind about the 
plan “after giving it more thought and talking it over with Joe [Paterno] yesterday.”  Curley 
now proposes to tell Sandusky “we feel there is a problem” and offer him “professional 
help.”  “If he is cooperative we would work with him to handle informing” the Second 
Mile; if Sandusky does not cooperate, “we don’t have a choice and will inform” DPW and 
the Second Mile.  “Additionally, I will let him know that his guests are not permitted to use 
our facilities.”  Spanier emails Curley and Schultz: “This approach is acceptable to me.”  
He adds: “The only downside for us is if the message isn’t ‘heard’ and acted upon, and we 
then become vulnerable for not having reported it.  But that can be assessed down the road.  
The approach you outline is humane and a reasonable way to proceed.”  Schultz concurs 
with the plan in an email to Curley and Spanier: “this is a more humane and upfront way to 
handle this.”  Schultz adds, “we can play it by ear” about informing DPW of the assault. 
44. Adam Clark, Penn State Trustees Respond to Freeh Report, MORNING CALL, July 12, 2012, http://ar-
ticles.mcall.com/2012-07-12/news/mc-penn-state-freeh-report-trustees-20120712_1_penn-state-trustees-
trustee-kenneth-frazier-spanier. 
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fifteen-year-old boy.  Furthermore, newly released testimony seemingly showed 
that coach Paterno might have known about Sandusky’s abuses as early as 1976 
(not 1998).45  These revelations became known after Penn State sued its insurer 
over the $92.8 million that was paid to settle thirty-two claims of abuse by 
Sandusky; Penn State sued over who should pay these settlements.46   
One issue in the insurance lawsuit was whether the insurer should pay  
settlement claims even though Penn State failed to notify the insurer about 
Sandusky’s behavior in a timely manner.  In denying Penn State’s request for 
summary judgment, the court noted, “[t]his case arises out of a series of heinous 
crimes perpetrated against a multitude of children over a forty-year period.”47  
Notably, the forty-year period noted by the court was considerably longer than 
the fourteen-year period (1998 to 2012) noted in both Sandusky’s grand jury 
indictment and the Freeh Report.  In addition to addressing evidence that the 
incidents started in 1971 (not 1998), and that Penn State officials likely knew 
about allegations as early as 1976, the court cited other previously unheard  
allegations that Penn State coaches also knew about other molestations by 
Sandusky and failed to act in 1987 and 1988, and “[t]hese events [we]re  
described in a number of the victims’ depositions.”48  Although the precise  
details from these incidents are unknown because the details are in sealed  
depositions, the court cited the depositions and suggested knowledge by Paterno 
dating back to 1976.49  The court noted that former President Graham Spanier, 
and VP Schultz apparently chose “to sweep the problem under the rug,” and that 
 
45. Pa. State Univ. v. Pa. Manufacturers’ Ass’n. Ins. Co., No. 03195, 2016 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 
158, at *4 (Pa. D. & C. May 4, 2016) (order granting motion for summary judgment).  The opinion from the 
insurance lawsuit, relying on sworn deposition from numerous witnesses, held that Paterno knew about 
Sandusky’s behavior much earlier and specifically stated that: 
Sandusky was employed by PSU as an Assistant Football Coach and Assistant Professor 
of Physical Education from 1969 until his retirement in 1999.  PMA claims Sandusky  
committed several acts of molestation early in his career at PSU: in 1976, a child allegedly 
reported to PSU’s Head Football Coach Joseph Paterno, that he (the child) was sexually 
molested by Sandusky; in 1987, a PSU Assistant Coach is alleged to have witnessed  
inappropriate contact between Sandusky and a child at a PSU facility; in 1988, another PSU 
Assistant Coach reportedly witnessed sexual contact between Sandusky and a child; and 
also in 1988, a child’s report of his molestation by Sandusky was allegedly referred to 
PSU’s Athletic Director. 
Id.  See Patrick Redford, Court Opinion Reveals Joe Paterno Reportedly Knew of Jerry Sandusky Molest-
ing Children as Early as 1976, DEADSPIN (May 5, 2016), https://deadspin.com/court-opinion-reveals-joe-
paterno-reportedly-knew-of-je-1775014993. 
46. Pa. State Univ., 2016 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 158, at *1–*2. 
47. Id. at *1. 
48. Id. at *1–*2. 
49. Charles Thompson, ‘I Don’t Want to Hear Any of That Stuff,’ Paterno told Sandusky accuser in 1976: 
Deposition, PENN LIVE, July 12, 2016, http://www.pennlive.com/news/2016/07/john_doe_150_tells_of_al-
leged.html. 
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Penn State’s failure to report a sexual predator on staff to its insurer—if proven 
at trial—could constitute “intentional omission of a material fact” and therefore 
render the insurance policy void.50 
B. The Baylor Scandal 
“Those are some bad dudes. Why was she around those 
guys?”51 – Coach Art Briles 
 
Despite the lessons that should have been learned from the Penn State  
scandal, allegations have surfaced that Baylor University officials and football 
coaches similarly failed to investigate and report numerous sexual assaults  
committed by football players dating back to 2009.  Since 2014, two Baylor 
football players, Tevin Elliot and Sam Ukwuachu, have been convicted of  
felony sexual assaults, and several other players face similar charges and  
allegations.52  Like at Penn State, the sexual assault cases against Tevin Elliot 
and Sam Ukwuachu are disturbing, but the level of knowledge possessed by 
Baylor officials and their inaction to these sexual assaults is possibly even more 
troubling.53 
 
50. Pa. State Univ., 2016 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 158, at *11–*12. 
51. Paula Lavigne & Mark Schlabach, Art Briles, Baylor Assistants Kept Players’ Misbehavior Under 
Wraps, Legal Documents Reveal, ABC NEWS, Feb 2, 2017, http://abcnews.go.com/Sports/art-briles-baylor-
assistants-players-misbehavior-wraps-legal/story?id=45235213. 
52. Bruce Tomaso, A Quick, Complete Guide to the Baylor Football Sex-Assault Scandal, DALL. 
MORNING NEWS, June 1, 2016, https://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/2016/04/14/how-a-sexual-assault-
scandal-engulfed-baylors-football-program.  In addition to the rape convictions of Elliot and Ukwuachu,  
Baylor football player, Shawn Oakman, has recently been charged with sexual assault and this rape occurred 
more than three years after Oakman was accused of assaulting another ex-girlfriend in 2013; several other 
Baylor football players have also allegedly committed uncharged acts of sexual assault, domestic violence, 
and other violence.  Id.  More recently, former Baylor football players, Shamycheal “Myke” Chatman and 
Tre’Von Armstead, have been indicted and arrested on three counts of sexual assault, a second-degree felony 
that is punishable by up to twenty years in prison, stemming from an alleged 2013 sexual assault when they 
were members of the Baylor football team.  Timeline: Baylor Sexual Assault Controversy, supra note 6. 
53. Paula Lavigne & Mark Schlabach, Waco Police Records Reveal Additional Violence Allegations 
Against Baylor Football Players, ESPN (May 19, 2016), 
http://www.espn.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/15562625/waco-police-records-reveal-additional-violence-allega-
tions-baylor-football-players. 
According to the police documents, at least some Baylor officials, including coaches, knew 
about many of the incidents, and most players did not miss playing time for disciplinary 
reasons.  None of the incidents has been widely reported in the media . . . . [There are also] 
several examples in which school officials either failed to investigate, or failed to  
adequately investigate, allegations of sexual violence.  In many cases, officials did not  
provide support to those who reported assaults, in apparent violation of Title IX federal law. 
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The problems at Baylor started to emerge in April 2012 after Baylor  
linebacker, Tevin Elliott, was arrested for raping a fellow Baylor student at a 
party; head football coach, Art Briles, said that Elliot was suspended because he 
had “violated a team policy” and declined further comment.54  Elliot was  
ultimately convicted of rape, sentenced to the maximum of twenty years in 
prison, and fined $10,000.00.55  During the trial, four other women testified that 
they were also raped by Elliott, starting in 2009.56  Charges were not filed in 
these other cases because the “Waco Police Department detectives failed to  
follow through with victim interviews.”57 
After Elliott’s rape conviction, disturbing details began to emerge about 
several Baylor officials who had failed to act even after many Baylor students 
had made rape allegations against Elliott.58  According to one of the rape  
victim’s mothers, Baylor “was not helpful in guiding her daughter during this 
academically stressful time.”59  Other rape victims claimed that Baylor officials 
“knew about previous sexual assault allegations against Elliott and failed to take 
proper action to protect other students.”60  Other information showed that Baylor 
officials hesitated to act even though six females reported being sexually  
 
54. Associated Press, Baylor’s Tevin Elliott Suspended for Violating Team Rule, ESPN (Apr. 30, 2012), 
http://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/7864666/baylor-tevin-elliott-suspended-violating-team-
rule. 
55. Tommy Witherspoon, Ex-BU Football Player Gets 20 Years in Sexual Assaults, WACO  
TRIB.-HERALD, Jan. 24, 2014, http://www.wacotrib.com/news/courts_and_trials/ex-bu-football-player-gets-
years-in-sexual-assaults/article_0e8c23fa-44cc-59da-a134-de9fe39a7d5e.html. 
56. Tomaso, supra note 52. 
57. Paula Ann Solis, Elliott Guilty: Ex-Football Player to Serve 20 Years for Assault, BAYLOR LARIAT, 
Jan. 24, 2014, http://baylorlariat.com/2014/01/24/elliott-guilty-ex-football-player-to-serve-20-years-for-as-
sault/. 
58. Tomaso, supra note 52. 
59. Solis, supra note 57. 
60. Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial at 11, Hernandez v. Baylor University Board of Regents, No. 
6:16-CV-00069 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2016), available at https://www.scribd.com/doc/306537753/Hernandez-
v-Baylor-Complaint; see Sue Ambrose & David Tarrant, Rape Survivor’s Lawsuit Details Claims That Bay-
lor, Art Briles Ignored Warning Signs, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Mar. 31, 2016, https://www.dal-
lasnews.com/news/news/2016/03/30/former-baylor-student-files-lawsuit-says-university-failed-to-protect-
her-from-sexual-assault; see also Tommy Witherspoon, Former Baylor Student’s Lawsuit Against School  
Alleges Negligence After Assaults, WACO TRIB.-HERALD, Mar. 31, 2016, 
http://www.wacotrib.com/news/higher_education/former-baylor-student-s-lawsuit-against-school-alleges-
negligence-after/article_a992bbfd-e0a5-5440-9c4d-278a60352d17.html. 
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assaulted by Elliott,61 and that head football coach, Art Briles, was aware of the 
reports62 and “looking into” the matter.63   
In addition to the troubling facts surrounding Baylor’s handling of Tevin 
Elliott’s sexual assaults, Baylor’s actions in the transfer and subsequent rape 
claim against football player, Sam Ukwuachu, raised questions.  In 2012, before 
transferring to Baylor, Ukwuachu was a freshman All-American football player 
at Boise State University.64  In May 2013, despite his stellar on-field  
performance, Boise State dismissed Ukwuachu for repeated violation of team 
rules.65  Ukwuachu was kicked off Boise State’s team after an incident of  
violence involving a female student; he allegedly attacked his girlfriend while 
drinking and using drugs.66  Less than one month later, Ukwuachu transferred 
to Baylor saying that a “minor problem occurred [at Boise State] and the 
coaches decided I needed to get a fresh start with somebody else.”67  Although 
it is unclear exactly what Baylor head football coach Art Briles knew about 
Ukwuachu’s problems at Boise State, at a minimum, he knew that Ukwuachu’s 
disciplinary history was serious enough for the team to dismiss the freshman 
All-American.68  Furthermore, according to then Boise State head football 
coach, Chris Petersen, “[a]fter Sam Ukwuachu was dismissed from the Boise 
 
61. Second Amended Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial at 5, Hernandez v. Baylor University Board of 
Regents, No. 6:16-CV-00069 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 12, 2016). 
At this meeting, McCraw informed Roe that there was nothing McCraw could do in  
response to Roe’s complaint that she had been raped by Elliott.  McCraw also told Roe and 
her mother that Roe was the sixth female student to come in to McCraw’s office to report 
that they had been sexually assaulted by Elliott.  Roe and her mother asked if Briles knew 
of these reports, to which McCraw responded that Briles was aware of the reports.  McCraw 
told Roe and her mother that there was nothing the school could do for Roe unless there 
was a court determination that Elliott had indeed raped Roe.  Otherwise, McCraw said, it 
would come down to a “he said-she said” situation, and the school could not act on it. 
Id.; see Witherspoon, supra note 60. 
62. Witherspoon, supra note 60. 
63. Id. 
64. Ukwuachu Named Freshman All-America, BOISE ST. BRONCOS, http://bron-
cosports.cstv.com/sports/m-footbl/spec-rel/010713aaa.html (last visited July 30, 2018). 
65. Jessica Luther & Dan Solomon, Silence at Baylor, TEX. MONTHLY, Aug. 20, 2015, http://www.tex-
asmonthly.com/article/silence-at-baylor/. 
66. Id.  In May 2013, Boise State’s assistant athletic director, Marc Paul, advised Ukwuachu’s  
then-girlfriend to stay away from Ukwuachu, after he put his fist through a window while drunk.  Id.  “Paul 
also . . . plan[ned] . . . to get police protection for the couple’s other housemate, who received threatening text 
messages from Ukwuachu.”  Id.  Another document from Boise State shows that “Ukwuachu would get  
verbally abusive over ‘small irritants’ like a spilled drink” and described Ukwuachu’s relationship with his 
girlfriend as “NOT healthy.”  Id. 
67. Jill Martin, Sam Ukwuachu Guilty: What Did Baylor Know Before?, CNN (Aug. 22, 2015), 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/21/us/baylor-football-player-guilty-sexual-assault/. 
68. Luther & Solomon, supra note 65. 
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State football program and expressed an interest in transferring to Baylor, I  
initiated a call with Coach Art Briles.  In that conversation, I thoroughly  
apprised Coach Briles of the circumstances surrounding Sam’s disciplinary  
record and dismissal,” which included violent, abusive, and threatening  
behavior against several students at Boise State University.69   
In October 2013, less than four months after Baylor accepted Ukwuachu, 
who had previously presented a threat to students on another college campus, 
he was charged with viciously raping a Baylor soccer student-athlete Jane 
Doe.70  After the alleged rape, Baylor conducted an investigation that was  
subsequently described as “shockingly brief,” involving only cursory interviews 
and a failure to look at the victim’s rape kit examination.71  Baylor was again 
seemingly more interested in protecting its football player and team than its  
female student body, and took no disciplinary action against Ukwuachu.72   
Several months later, when prosecutors finally learned about the case from the 
Waco police department, Ukwuachu was quickly indicted (and subsequently 
convicted for felony sexual assault); the court even deemed Baylor’s initial in-
vestigation to be so “insufficient” that it restricted the defense from even  
referencing it during Ukwuachu’s trial.73   
Even after Ukwuachu’s indictment on felony sexual assault charges, Baylor 
officials downplayed the significance of the alleged rape; Baylor’s defensive 
coordinator, Phil Bennett, said that the defensive end had “some issues” and 
 
69. Martin, supra note 67. 
70. Luther & Solomon, supra note 65.  At the rape trial, Doe testified that Ukwuachu grabbed her after 
she resisted his initial advances:  
“He was using all of his strength to pull up my dress and do stuff to me . . . .  He had me on 
my stomach on the bed, and he was on top of me.”  Doe testified that [Ukwuachu] pulled 
her dress up, pulled her underwear to the side, . . . forced her legs open . . . , [and] then 
forced himself inside of her.  Doe was a virgin at the time [and] . . . testified, “I was  
screaming stop and no.” [Afterwards, Ukwuachu] told her “This isn’t rape,” [and] asked 
. . . if she was going to call the police . . . .”    
Id.  Doe told two friends who picked her up that Ukwuachu had raped her.  Id.  On the next day, “Doe 
went to the hospital and . . . a sexual assault nurse examination [revealed] vaginal injuries including redness,  
bleeding, and friction injuries.”  Id.  Other trial testimony showed that, earlier in the week and before the rape, 
Ukwuachu and Doe had exchanged text messages: 
 Doe [was] unambiguous that she [was] not interested in a physical or romantic relationship.  
[Ukwuachu] [texted] “we have unfinished business,” in reference to a previous encounter, 
. . . characterized [by Doe] as Ukwuachu trying to put “moves” on her.  She replied “I don’t 
think we need finish any business” and “let’s just chill.”   
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
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“w[ould] not practice for awhile.”74  Prior to the next season and before  
Ukwuachu’s trial, coach Bennett told members of the media that he expected 
Ukwuachu to play during the season.  Thus, for fourteen months, from June 
2014 until August 2015, Baylor never elaborated on Ukwuachu’s “issues.”   
Finally, in August of 2015, after news about Ukwuachu’s sexual assault charges 
finally broke—more than twenty months after the rape—Baylor’s community 
learned that Ukwuachu’s “issues” were two felony rape charges75 and Baylor 
head coach Art Briles said, “I like the way we’ve handled it as a university, an 
athletic department, and a football program.”76  Less than one month later, after 
Ukwuachu’s conviction for sexual assault, Baylor’s President, Ken Starr,  
denounced this “unspeakable tragedy” and insisted that Baylor will work  
“tirelessly” to provide a safe environment for its students and that perpetrators 
of sexual violence will “find no shelter on our campus.”77  In the same statement, 
President Starr called for “a comprehensive internal inquiry into the  
circumstances associated with this case and the conduct of the various offices 
involved.”78  Less than one week later, Baylor hired outside counsel to conduct 
a “thorough and independent external investigation into the university’s  
handling of cases of alleged sexual violence.”79  Baylor hired Pepper Hamilton 
 
74. Id. (noting that although Ukwuachu did not practice with the team, he was allowed to condition with 
the team). 
75. Tommy Witherspoon, Baylor Football Player to Stand Trial for Sexual Assault, WACO  
TRIB.-HERALD, Aug. 5, 2015, http://www.wacotrib.com/sports/baylor/football/bu-defensive-end-set-for-
trial-on-sexual-assault-charge/article_6d9ff60d-38a9-5930-a68c-b214ad0e4b7d.html. 
76. John Werner, Baylor notebook: Oakman Talks About His Python; Ukwuachu Noticeably Absent;  
Roster Changes, WACO TRIB.-HERALD: BEARS EXTRA, Aug. 7, 2015, http://www.wacotrib.com/sports/bay-
lor/football/baylor-notebook-oakman-talks-about-his-python-ukwuachu-noticeably-absent/article_53e9cf66-
2b85-5740-a9dd-bcab117bd482.html. 
77. Ken Starr, Our Stand Against Sexual Violence, BAYLOR UNIV. (Aug. 21, 2015), http://www.bay-
lor.edu/president/news.php?action=story&story=159265.  Baylor President Ken Starr’s statement read in part: 
Yesterday, a former student-athlete was convicted for the sexual assault of another former 
student-athlete.  Our hearts are broken for the victim who has been terribly harmed by this 
unspeakable tragedy . . . .  In addition to the work already being undertaken by our Title IX 
Office, we are doing everything in our power to ensure that acts of sexual violence are not 
committed and that those who perpetrate them will find no shelter on our campus. 
78. Id. 
79. Baylor President Ken Starr Statement on Internal Inquiry, Next Steps, BAYLOR UNIV. (Aug. 28, 
2015), http://www.baylor.edu/mediacommunications/news.php?action=story&story=159497.  Baylor  
President Ken Starr’s full statement: 
We must guarantee there is no room at Baylor University for those who would perpetrate 
sexual violence on our campus.  I want to thank Jeremy Counseller, Professor of Law and 
Faculty Athletics Representative, for his judgment and guidance.  After reviewing the  
results of his internal inquiry, I am recommending that our Board of Regents retain the 
services of outside counsel to investigate thoroughly these matters and recommend  
continued improvements.  The Board plans to announce its selection of outside counsel 
early next week. 
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Law Firm to engage “in an open exploration of the issues with no limitation by 
the University” and was “provided with unfettered access to personnel and 
data.”80  According to the Board of Regents, “Pepper’s review was detailed, 
thorough and rigorous.”81 
Similar to the independent Freeh Report commissioned by Penn State,  
Baylor’s Board of Regents wanted to conduct “an independent and external  
review of Baylor’s institutional response,” a response which seemed eerily  
similar to Penn State because Baylor officials, including President Kenneth 
Starr, AD Ian McCaw, and football coach Art Briles, had seemingly ignored 
repeated warnings about sexual assaults on campus.  For over a decade, reports 
had surfaced that these Baylor officials had openly ignored sexual assault claims 
made against eight football players and even retaliated against the women who 
made such claims.   
After this “rigorous” investigation which included a “high-level audit of all 
reports of sexual harassment or violence for three academic years,” the Pepper 
Hamilton report concluded that Baylor had completely mishandled multiple 
rape allegations against football players.82  The Report detailed a stunning will-
ingness to seemingly do anything to win football games and ultimately  
concluded “football was above the rules.”83  Similar to the findings in Penn 
State’s Freeh Report, Baylor seemingly cared more about protecting its football 
program than preventing further sexual assaults or the well-being of the sexual 
assault victims, many of whom were female students at Baylor.  The report  
ultimately found that the athletic department leadership left women on campus 
 
In addition, I am creating a unique position, housed in the Division of Athletics, that has 
the authority and oversight of all student-athlete behavior.  This officer-level position will 
report directly to the President and ensure our student-athletes maintain the high level of 
personal ethics and integrity that Baylor Nation demands.  I will work directly with the 
Board of Regents to formulate the specific responsibilities of this position. 
Baylor University is committed to maintaining the highest degree of campus safety to  
protect the welfare of all our students.  This is central to Baylor’s mission as a Christian 
university and at the heart of our commitment to our students, faculty and staff.  We must 
have zero tolerance for sexual violence on our athletic teams and our campus. 
80. BAYLOR UNIV., supra note 7 (in August 2015, Baylor University engaged Pepper Hamilton LLP 
(Pepper) “to conduct an independent and external review of Baylor University’s institutional response to Title 
IX and related compliance issues through the lens of specific [sexual assault] cases.”). 
81. Id. at 2 (noting that “Pepper conducted document-based interviews to ensure accuracy, integrity and  
efficiency, and Pepper’s findings and recommendations are based on the law, related authority, facts and  
reasonable inferences from the facts.”). 
82. Id. at 1.  
83. Id. at 10-11 (finding that “[i]n some cases, football coaches and staff had inappropriate involvement 
in disciplinary and criminal matters or engaged in improper conduct that reinforced an overall perception that 
football was above the rules, and that there was no culture of accountability for misconduct.”).  
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at risk by discouraging victims from reporting assaults and keeping accusations 
against Baylor football players quiet.   
Baylor University’s Board of Regents issued its “Findings of Fact” which 
identified systemic problems within the school and its athletic program,  
including the following: A high-level audit of all known reports of sexual  
harassment and assaults, from 2012–2015, showed that the “overwhelming  
majority of cases did not move forward to an adjudicative hearing, with only an 
extremely limited number of cases resulting in a finding of responsibility or 
significant sanction.”84  This occurred because University personnel: 
discouraged, rather than encouraged, participation in the  
University’s Title IX processes . . . . because of an erroneous 
determination that Baylor did not have jurisdiction in off  
campus matters or because [of improper determinations] that 
there was not a preponderance of the evidence based on an  
inadequate or uninformed investigation.85   
These actions “contributed to or accommodated a hostile environment” and 
the University even retaliated “against a complainant for reporting sexual  
assault.”86  Baylor had fundamentally failed “to implement Title IX of the Edu-
cation Amendments of 1972 (Title IX) and the Violence Against Women 
 
84. Id. at 6.  
85. BAYLOR UNIV., supra note 7, at 7.  Baylor’s investigation of Sam Ukwuachu’s sexual assault  
allegation was a sham that somehow failed to find a “preponderance of evidence” [the standard required under 
Title IX to expel a player] even though a criminal court later found him guilty of sexual assault under the 
much higher “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of evidence.  Id. 
86. Id. at 7-10. 
The investigations reviewed were wholly inadequate to fairly and reliably evaluate whether 
sexual violence had occurred . . . .  Administrators engaged in conduct that could be  
perceived as victim-blaming, focusing on the complainant’s choices and actions, rather than 
robustly investigating the allegations, including the actions of the respondent.  In many 
instances, student conduct investigators conducted cursory investigations and failed to  
identify and interview readily apparent witnesses or gather relevant evidence.  Student  
conduct investigators also applied the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof in 
an inconsistent manner, and in many instances, required a far greater level of proof than 
preponderance . . . .  In some instances, administrative responses and campus processes 
caused significant harm to complainants . . . [and] accommodated or created a hostile envi-
ronment, rather than taking action to eliminate a hostile environment . . . .  Baylor failed to 
conduct adequate training and education for its students and employees . . . [and thereby] 
created an atmosphere that did not foster reporting and participation in the Title IX process.  
[As a result,] Baylor’s students lacked awareness of the range of conduct prohibited under 
Title IX and of University policies, resources or reporting options . . . [and] may have led 
to significant underreporting by students and missed opportunities by administrators to  
respond appropriately to reports.  [Also,] [o]nce aware of a potential pattern of sexual  
violence, the University failed to take prompt and effective action to protect campus safety 
and protect future victims from harm. 
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Reauthorization Act of 2013 (VAWA).”87  It ultimately concluded that Baylor 
allowed a culture that failed to hold the football team accountable, discouraged 
victims from filing complaints, and, on numerous occasions, neglected to  
remove victims from potentially dangerous situations with assailants.88 
In addition to these broader University failings, the Board of Regents  
admitted specific failings within both the football program and Athletic  
department leadership.  According to the Board of Regents, the choices made 
by football staff and athletics leadership “posed a risk to campus safety and the 
integrity of the University.”89  These leaders failed “to take appropriate action 
to respond to reports of sexual assault and dating violence reportedly committed 
by football players.”90  The football coaches and staff “took affirmative steps to 
maintain internal control over discipline of players and to actively divert cases 
from the student conduct or criminal processes.”91  In some instances, “athletics 
and football personnel affirmatively chose not to report sexual violence and  
dating violence to an appropriate administrator outside of athletics,” and thereby 
protected players from university and law enforcement investigation and  
punishment.92  In several cases, “football coaches or staff met directly with a 
 
87. Id. at 1.  Noting with respect to Title IX and VAWA requirements: 
Baylor failed to provide training and education to students; failed to identify and train  
responsible employees under Title IX; failed to provide clear information about reporting 
options and resources on campus; failed to have a centralized process for ensuring that all 
reports reached the Title IX Coordinator; failed to impose appropriate interim measures in 
many cases; failed to appropriately evaluate and balance institutional safety and Title IX 
obligations against a complainant’s request for anonymity or that no action/investigation 
be pursued against; failed to conduct prompt, equitable, adequate, and reliable  
investigations; failed to give complainants access to full range of procedural options under 
the policy; and failed to take sufficient action to identify, eliminate, prevent and address a 
potential hostile environment in individual cases. 
Id. at 4-5. 
88. Id. at 9. 
In some instances, administrative responses and campus processes caused significant harm 
to complainants.  Actions by an University administrator within [the Baylor University  
police department] and an administrator within an academic program contributed to, and in 
some instances, accommodated or created a hostile environment, rather than taking action 
to eliminate a hostile environment. 
89. Id. at 10 (“Leadership in football and the athletics department did not set the tone, establish a policy 
or practice for reporting and documenting significant misconduct.”).  Id. at 12. 
90. BAYLOR UNIV., supra note 7, at 10. 
91. Id. at 11 (“Football staff conducted their own untrained internal inquiries, outside of policy, which 
improperly discredited complainants and denied them the right to a fair, impartial and informed investigation 
. . . .”). 
92. Id. at 10.  Baylor’s informal system of discipline involved multiple coaches and administrators, relied 
heavily upon their individual judgment without any clear standards for discipline, and resulted in conduct 
being ignored or players being dismissed from the team based on an informal and entirely subjective process.  
Id. 
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[sexual assault] complainant and/or a parent of a complainant and did not report 
the misconduct,” and even worked to discredit the sexual assault accusers.93   
Instead of properly reporting such incidents, “football coaches and staff had  
inappropriate involvement in disciplinary and criminal matters or engaged in 
improper conduct that reinforced an overall perception that football was above 
the rules, and that there was no culture of accountability for misconduct.”94  As 
a result, the football and athletic department leadership failed to address  
“cultural concerns within the football program, or protect campus safety once 
aware of a potential pattern of sexual violence by multiple football players.”95  
Further, Baylor football coaches and staff did not attempt to understand why 
sexual assault complaints against players were so prevalent, the root causes of 
their behavior, or the steps needed to prevent the recurrence.  Finally, Baylor 
coaches and staff allowed football players to act with impunity and simply  
dismissed alleged offenders or helped them transfer to another school instead of 
reporting them.96  Then, Baylor coaches and staff did not properly investigate 
 
93. Id. 
[F]ootball coaches or staff met directly with a complainant and/or a parent of a complainant 
and did not report the misconduct . . . .  Football staff conducted their own untrained internal 
inquiries, outside of policy, which improperly discredited complainants and denied them 
the right to a fair, impartial and informed investigation, interim measures or processes 
promised under University policy. 
94. Id. at 11 (“The football program’s separate system of internal discipline reinforces the perception that 
rules applicable to other students are not applicable to football players, improperly insulates football players 
from appropriate disciplinary consequences, and puts students, the program, and the institution at risk of future 
misconduct.”).  Id. at 12. 
95.  BAYLOR UNIV., supra note 7, at 10. 
Football staff conducted their own untrained internal inquiries, outside of policy, which 
improperly discredited complainants and denied them the right to a fair, impartial and  
informed investigation, interim measures or processes promised under University policy.  
In some cases, internal steps gave the illusion of responsiveness to complainants but failed 
to provide a meaningful institutional response under Title IX.  Further, because reports were 
not shared outside of athletics, the University missed critical opportunities to impose  
appropriate disciplinary action that would have removed offenders from campus and  
possibly precluded future acts of sexual violence against Baylor students.  In some  
instances, the football program dismissed players for unspecified team violations and  
assisted them in transferring to other schools.  As a result, some football coaches and staff 
abdicated responsibilities under Title IX and Clery; to student welfare; to the health and 
safety of complainants; and to Baylor’s institutional values . . . .  The University and  
Athletics Department failed to take effective action in response to allegations involving 
misconduct by football staff [even after] other departments repeatedly raised concerns 
[about] the Athletics Department’s response. 
96. Id. at 11 (“[Baylor football coaches] reinforced an overall perception that football was above the rules, 
and that there was no culture of accountability for misconduct . . . .  In some instances, the football program 
dismissed players for unspecified team violations and assisted them in transferring to other schools.”). 
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football players who were transferring to Baylor, including researching their 
disciplinary and criminal records.97 
In addition to the information released by Baylor’s Board of Regents based 
on the Pepper Hamilton report, the following additional information has been 
uncovered about the action and inaction at Baylor: 
ESPN reported that multiple victims reported that Briles, Starr, and other 
Baylor officials, including coaches, knew about numerous reports of sexual  
violence by football players, did nothing about it, and even worked with the 
police to hide investigations from the press and the public.98 
For two years, Baylor failed to investigate sexual assault claims even though 
it was required to by Title IX and failed to hire a Title IX coordinator until 2014, 
three years after it was required by the Department of Education.99 
Finally, evidence showed that the apparent cover-ups extended from the 
football office to the university to the Waco police department, in a concerted 
effort to protect the football program at the expense of victims, whom the  
university systematically failed to provide with resources and support.  One 
woman, who reportedly notified the football team chaplain, head coach Art 
Briles, and University President Starr about being assaulted by a Baylor football 
player, said Baylor’s actions had a chilling effect on the reporting of sexual  
assaults: “I’d seen other girls go through it, and nothing ever happened to the 
football players.  It’s mind-boggling to see it continue to happen.  I can’t  
 
97. Id. at 13. 
Baylor did not consistently conduct due diligence with respect to potential transfers.  In at 
least one identified instance, the process reflected a failure to conduct appropriate due  
diligence and assessment of risk regarding past criminal or student conduct and an  
affirmative decision not to seek additional information about an athlete’s prior criminal or 
student conduct records. 
Id.  In one incident, Baylor accepted a transfer football player, Sam Ukwuachu, without requesting any 
records from Boise State that showed that he was released by Boise State due to his violent temperament.  Just 
months after he arrived onto the campus in Waco, Texas, Ukwuachu raped a female Baylor student.  See 
generally Luther & Solomon, supra note 65. 
98. Lavigne & Schlabach, supra note 53 (“According to the police documents, at least some Baylor  
officials, including coaches, knew about many of the incidents, and most players did not miss playing time 
for disciplinary reasons.”). 
99. Paula Lavigne, Baylor Didn’t Investigate Sex Assault Claim Against Players for Two Years, ESPN: 
OUTSIDE THE LINES (Apr. 14, 2016), http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/15191102/baylor-investigate-sex-
assault-claim-football-players-more-two-years-lines. 
Baylor University did not investigate a sexual assault report made against two football  
players for more than two years, despite the school’s obligation under federal law to  
immediately address allegations of sexual violence involving students . . . .  Moreover, it 
took Baylor more than three years to comply with a federal directive to hire a full-time Title 
IX coordinator. 
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understand why.  I think as long as they’re catching footballs and scoring  
touchdowns, the school won’t do anything.”100 
These reports showed that Baylor officials feigned ignorance and even 
blamed the victims despite knowing that its football players were  
terrorizing women.  The Baylor Board of Regents specifically recognized that: 
[t]he comprehensive investigation by Pepper Hamilton and the 
subsequent Findings of Fact fully and openly outlined systemic 
failures across the University regarding Title IX policies,  
procedures and University personnel. . . .  We recognize this is 
a tumultuous time for Baylor, most importantly for our current 
and former students and victims of sexual assault.  We were 
horrified by what we learned from the investigation and again 
express our public acknowledgment and deepest apologies.101   
 The chairperson of Baylor’s Board of Regents added, 
[w]e were horrified by the extent of these acts of sexual  
violence on our campus.  This investigation revealed the  
University’s mishandling of reports in what should have been 
a supportive, responsive and caring environment for students 
. . . .  The depth to which these acts occurred shocked and  
outraged us.  Our students and their families deserve more, and 
we have committed our full attention to improving our  
processes, establishing accountability and ensuring appropriate 
actions are taken to support former, current and future  
students.102 
Although the complete fallout from Baylor is still evolving, the scandal has 
led to the firings or resignations of Baylor’s head football coach Art Briles, 
President & Chancellor Ken Starr, AD Ian McCaw, and other Baylor officials. 
The leadership failure at Baylor was eerily similar to Penn State because, 
after allegations of sexual assaults, the leadership at both schools failed to act 
legally and ethically.  The problems at Baylor, unfortunately, serve as a  
reminder that, even after Penn State, institutional leaders (i.e. coaches, athletic 
directors, and administrators) may still fail to respond properly to allegations of 
sexual misconduct, especially when it involves a highly successful football 
 
100. Lavigne & Schlabach, supra at 53. 
101. Reagan Roy, REPORT: Former Baylor Student Files Formal Title IX Complaint with U.S.  
Department of Education, EAST TEX. MATTERS, June 1, 2016, http://www.easttexasmatters.com/news/local-
news/report-former-baylor-student-files-formal-title-ix-compalint-with-us-department-of-education. 
102. Id.; Baylor University Media Communications, Baylor University Board of Regents Announces  
Leadership Changes and Extensive Corrective Actions Following Findings of External Investigation (May 
26, 2016), http://www.baylor.edu/mediacommunications/news.php?action=story&story=170207. 
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coach and program.  Even though the Penn State story was beyond shocking, 
the Baylor saga makes it abundantly clear that Penn State’s situation did not 
cause fundamental legal or institutional changes to occur within big-time  
college athletics and shows that a dark and troubling culture continues to exist 
even within highly prestigious universities: a culture built on intense loyalty to 
protect the interests of the athletic program, almost at any cost.  At both Penn 
State and Baylor, prestigious universities—led by both prominent university 
presidents and high-profile head football coaches—systematically protected its 
football program at the expense of victims of sexual violence. 
Perhaps even more troubling, even after the institutional failures at Baylor 
and Penn State, universities are still seemingly beholden to the “winning at all 
costs” culture.103  In June 2016, less than one week after Baylor coach Art Briles 
lost his job for giving out too many second chances and ignoring known risks, 
Mississippi State University showed that the lessons from Penn State and Baylor 
were not being learned.  Rather than revoking the scholarship of a top football 
recruit who was charged with assault after a video showed him beating a woman 
repeatedly and gloating as he walked away, Mississippi State allowed the recruit 
to enroll and gave him a one-game suspension.104  Mississippi State AD Scott 
Stricklin said these “type of actions and poor decisions are not acceptable,” but 
then added, “[f]ive seconds of a really poor choice shouldn’t preclude an  
individual from going to school.”105  This overly forgiving reaction,  
unfortunately, seems eerily similar to the response at Baylor.  Even after the 
Peppers report, former University President Ken Starr said: “I can’t disagree 
with the policy judgment to give second chances to young men with a very tough 
past. . . .  Yes, in retrospect it would have been a lot safer to say to these young 
men, no, we’re not going to give a second chance.”106  Mississippi State’s  
response seems to ignore or callously disregard potential dangers to the entire 
university student population for the good of the football program.  These  
 
103. Pete Van Mullem, The Baylor Scandal: A Self-Check for Educators, PHYSICAL & HEALTH EDUC. 
AM. (July 16, 2016), http://www.pheamerica.org/2016/the-baylor-scandal-a-self-check-for-educators/.  In  
recent years, there have also been lower profile examples of educational leaders remaining loyal to their  
athletic programs at Florida State University, the University of Montana, and the University of Oregon.  Id. 
104. Andrea Adelson, Mississippi State Bulldogs Learn Nothing from Baylor Bears in Jeffery Simmons 
Decision, ESPN (June 2, 2016), http://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/15914709/mississippi-
state-bulldogs-learn-baylor-bears-jeffery-simmons-decision.  Jeffrey Simmons, an ESPN 300 football recruit, 
has assault charges pending stemming from an incident where he was shown on video beating a woman  
repeatedly.  Id. 
105. Id. 
106. Id.; See Mark Schlabach, Brett McMurphy, Paula Lavigne, Jake Trotter, & the Associated Press, 
Kenneth Starr to Resign as Chancellor of Baylor But Will Continue to Teach, ESPN (June 1, 2016), 
http://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/15875833/kenneth-starr-resign-chancellor-baylor-continue-
teach. 
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scandals unfortunately show that no university, no matter how prestigious, is 
immune from scandal, and a culture of abuse and cover-up can likely occur at 
any major university, this warning has recently been proven again at Michigan 
State University.  One of the big issues raised by these scandals is the  
relationship between the universities, the NCAA, and the legal system.  The 
legal system can put sexual abusers in jail and impose civil liability on  
universities, but only the NCAA has the ability to impose eligibility sanctions 
against these universities.  
II. STATE & FEDERAL LAWS – REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 
One of the most troubling developments in the Penn State and Baylor  
scandals was the failure by university and athletic department officials to act 
promptly and swiftly upon learning about possible criminal conduct.  This  
section examines some of the state and federal laws that require investigation 
and reporting of criminal activity.  The state law section focuses on mandatory 
reporter laws and the failure to report charges brought against Penn State  
officials; the federal law section focuses on the Title IX lawsuits brought against 
Baylor officials for inaction. 
A. State Laws – Reporting Criminal Conduct 
In the aftermath of the Penn State scandal, both “failure to report” and “child 
endangerment” charges were filed against three high-level Penn State officials: 
former President Spanier, former AD Tim Curley, and former VP Gary 
Schultz.107  Although the Penn State officials moved to have the charges 
dropped, prosecutors justified the charges under precedent set during the 2012 
conviction of a high-ranking Catholic Church official in Philadelphia.108  In that 
case, Monsignor William Lynn was found guilty of “child endangerment” after 
he reassigned priests to new jobs where they could continue to prey on children, 
even after those priests had credible sexual abuse allegations lodged against 
them.109  Monsignor Lynn’s conviction was a landmark sexual abuse case  
 
107. The court documents for these cases can be found at: http://www.dauphincounty.org/govern-
ment/courts/curley_schultz_spanier_case_information/index.php.  
108. Jon Hurdle & Eric Eckholm, Msgr. William Lynn of Philadelphia is Convicted of Allowing Abuse, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/23/us/philadelphias-msgr-william-j-lynn-is-
convicted-of-allowing-abuse.html?_r=0. 
109. Id. (during the child endangerment trial, prosecutors produced evidence showing that the  
administrator of Philadelphia’s Archdiocese had reassigned priests known to have sexually abused children 
to new parishes without the new pastor’s or community’s knowledge). 
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because he was the first high-ranking church official in the United States to be 
convicted based on the actions of his subordinates.110 
Similar to the Lynn case, where a high-ranking church official failed to take 
appropriate action despite credible evidence of sexual abuse, Pennsylvania’s 
Chief Deputy Attorney General (AG) Laura Ditka believed that emails from 
Penn State President Spanier, VP Schultz, and AD Curley proved a collaborated 
plan to not report Sandusky to police or child welfare officials despite  
information from graduate assistant coach McQueary, and this inaction foiled a 
direct opportunity to catch a predator.111  After this inaction and failure to report, 
Sandusky went on to sexually abuse several more boys and his access to Penn 
State teams and athletic events allegedly helped lure to the boys to these  
facilities.112  According to AG Ditka, when the administrators decided to handle 
graduate assistant coach McQueary’s report in-house, “they assumed the duty 
to ensure the matter was handled thoroughly and correctly and cannot now shrug 
off the responsibility that they chose to assume.”113  Even though Sandusky was 
no longer an employee at Penn State, AG Ditka believed that the Penn State 
administrators collectively “still had the duty to ensure that the allegations of 
sexual improprieties . . . were fully investigated and that sexual predators were 
excluded from the facilities for which they were responsible.”114   
Not surprisingly, in an effort to be exonerated from criminal liability,  
President Spanier, AD Curley, and VP Schultz initially vigorously denied these 
“child endangerment” and “failure to report” charges.115  All three Penn State 
officials denied knowing about the scope of Sandusky’s alleged abuses and 
claimed that the record would prove that they made a thoughtful attempt to deal 
seriously with a potentially horrific situation that lacked clarity.116  Shortly  
before trial, however, AD Curley and VP Schultz accepted a plea bargain deal 
in which both pled guilty to one count of endangering children and agreed to 
testify in the case against former Penn State President Graham Spanier.117  AD 
 
110. Id. (guilty verdict “was hailed by victim advocates who have argued for years that senior church 
officials should be held accountable for concealing evidence and transferring predatory priests to unwary 
parishes.”). 
111. Charles Thompson, Attorney General Ties Jerry Sandusky Cover-Up Prosecution to Catholic 
Church Sex-Abuse Case, PENN LIVE, Aug. 25, 2016, http://www.pennlive.com/news/2016/08/attorney_gen-
erals_office_hinge.html. 
112. See GRAND JURY REPORT ON ALLEGED PENN STATE SEX ABUSE, supra note 15, at 11. 
113. Thompson, supra note 111. 
114. Id. 
115. Id.  
116. Id. 
117. Colin Dwyer, 2 Former Penn State Administrators Plead Guilty to Roles in Abuse Scandal, NPR: 
THE TWO-WAY (Mar. 13, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/03/13/519996345/2-former-
penn-state-administrators-plead-guilty-to-roles-in-abuse-scandal. 
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Curley was ultimately sentenced to seven to twenty-three months (with three 
months in jail and the remainder served under house arrest) and VP Schultz was 
sentenced to six to twenty-three months (with two months in jail and the  
remainder served under house arrest).118 
Both AD Curley and VP Schultz testified against ex-Penn State President 
Spanier who was ultimately convicted on child endangerment charges, but  
acquitted on conspiracy charges.119  During the case, the Prosecutors argued that 
Spanier acted criminally when he did not demand that Sandusky be immediately 
reported to child protection services, after learning about graduate assistant 
coach McQueary’s report about the shower incident.120  The key evidence was 
emails exchanged between the three Penn State officials where they seemingly 
agreed to not report Sandusky to law enforcement or child protection services, 
and only barred Sandusky from bringing children to Penn State facilities.121  In 
an email to AD Curley and VP Schultz, President Spanier specifically wrote that 
“[t]he only downside to us is if the message isn’t ‘heard’ and acted upon [by 
Sandusky], and we then become vulnerable for not having reported it;” Spanier 
called the plan “humane and a reasonable way to proceed,” but the jury  
ultimately convicted Spanier based on his own words.122  One juror noted, “It 
didn’t feel like they were conspiring to endanger children, . . . . [t]hey were  
conspiring to protect Penn State.”123  President Spanier was sentenced to four to 
twelve months, with the first two months in jail and the remainder served under 
house arrest.124   
 
118. Will Hobson, Former Penn State President Graham Spanier Sentenced to Jail for Child  
Endangerment in Jerry Sandusky Abuse Case, WASH. POST, June 2, 2017, https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/sports/wp/2017/06/02/former-penn-state-president-graham-spanier-sentenced-to-jail-for-
child-endangerment-in-jerry-sandusky-abuse-case/?utm_term=.d9081bf01da7. 
119. Jess Bidgood & Richard Pérez-Peña, Former Penn State President Found Guilty in Sandusky Abuse 
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/24/us/graham-panier-jerry-sandusky-
penn-state.html?_r=0. 
120. Jason Slotkin, Ex-Penn State President Guilty of Child Endangerment in Abuse Scandal, NPR: THE 
TWO-WAY (Mar. 24, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/03/24/521427407/ex-penn-state-
president-guilty-of-child-endangerment-in-abuse-scandal. 
121. Hobson, supra note 118. 
122. Slotkin, supra note 120. See Associated Press, Ex-Penn State President Guilty of 1 Count of Child 
Endangerment, USA TODAY, Mar. 24, 2017, https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2017/03/24/ex-
penn-state-president-guilty-1-count-child-endangerment/99596538/. 
123. Mark Scolforo, Juror: Ex PSU President’s Own Words Showed He Knew of Sandusky Allegations, 
INQUIRER, Jan. 11, 2017, http://www.philly.com/philly/news/pennsylvania/penn-state-sandusky-spanier-
jury.html. 
124. Hobson, supra note 118. 
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B. State Law – Reporting Requirements 
Although anyone can report suspected child abuse, all states have statutes 
identifying which persons are required to report suspected child maltreatment 
to either child protective services, a law enforcement agency, or a state’s  
toll-free child abuse reporting hotline.125  These so-called “mandatory reporters” 
are people who are required by law to report suspected child abuse and are held 
legally responsible for not reporting suspected child abuse, and generally  
include people who come into contact with children as a part of their  
employment or profession, or even as volunteers in programs designed to serve 
children.126  These mandatory reporting laws127 ordinarily address: (1) the  
persons who are required to report suspected abuse (i.e., who is a mandatory 
reporter?), (2) the definitions for the types of abuse that must be reported (i.e., 
what constituted child abuse, physical abuse, sexual abuse, emotional abuse, 
and neglect that needed to be reported), (3) the standards for knowing when to 
report abuse (i.e., knowledge and reasonable suspicion) and the specifics of the 
reporting requirements (i.e., how, when, and to whom a report must be filed?), 
and (4) the consequences for failing to report.128 
As a result of the scandal at Penn State and even before the aforementioned 
cases against the three Penn State officials concluded, legislators in Pennsylva-
nia (and other states) scrambled to re-examine and strengthen their state laws 
on child endangerment and the mandated reporting of criminal  
activity.  According to the grand jury report in the Penn State scandal, one of 
the applicable provisions stated that when a staff member reports abuse, “the 
person in charge of the school or institution has the responsibility and legal  
obligation to report or cause such a report to be made by telephone and in  
writing within 48 hours to the Department of Public Welfare.”129  Thus, even 
though the wording of Pennsylvania’s mandatory reporting law appeared to be 
clear and unambiguous, state lawmakers still set up a special commission to 
review and revise the law after the Penn State scandal.130 
 
125. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 1 
(2015), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/manda.pdf. 
126. Id. at 2. 
127. Id. (detailing the state statutes for reporting child abuse and neglect and noting that forty-eight states 
have mandatory reporting laws but these laws varied from state to state). 
128. Id.  
129. See GRAND JURY REPORT ON ALLEGED PENN STATE SEX ABUSE, supra note 15, at 12. 
130. Changes to Pennsylvania’s Child Protective Services Law, SENATOR GENE YAW, http://www.sena-
torgeneyaw.com/changes-to-pennsylvanias-child-protective-services-law/ (last visited July 30, 2018) (noting 
that, during the 2013–2014 Legislative Session, “23 pieces of legislation were enacted changing and  
improving how Pennsylvania responds to child abuse.”). 
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As a direct result of the special commission, the Pennsylvania Legislature, 
during the 2013–14 session, ultimately enacted twenty-three pieces of  
legislation aimed at making sweeping improvements to Pennsylvania’s Child 
Protective Services Law.131  Many of these laws were directed at mandated  
reporting and were designed to improve the required response to child abuse, 
including making critical improvements to the list of individuals who were  
required to report child abuse, providing for multidisciplinary investigative 
teams to coordinate child abuse investigations between county agencies and law 
enforcement, and increasing the penalty for a mandated reporter’s failure to  
report child abuse while also providing whistleblower protection to anyone who 
made a good faith report of suspected child abuse.132 
C. Who is a Mandatory Reporter? 
Perhaps the biggest horror in the Penn State scandal is the fact that so many 
people were aware of the likely abuse and could have helped bring the abuse to 
the attention of authorities, but they did not do so and were seemingly not legally 
required to do so.  As a result, many legislators began rethinking mandatory 
reporter laws with respect to who should have a duty to report to the police or 
state agencies.  In most states, including Pennsylvania, the law did not require 
everyone who suspected child abuse to report it to authorities.133  Instead, most 
state laws only required members of certain professions who have frequent  
contact with children to be mandated by law to report child abuse.  Thus,  
reporting laws generally only required teachers, doctors, social workers, peace 
officers, and emergency responders, and sometimes daycare workers and  
voluntary athletic coaches, to report child abuse.134  Pennsylvania’s new  
legislation extended the list of mandatory reporters to include athletic coaches, 
licensing boards, camp counselors, and employers.135  It specifically delineated 
sixteen categories of mandatory reporters, including all school employees, all 
staff at childcare and medical facilities, and also volunteers who work regularly 
with youth activities (i.e., sports, church groups, boy scouts, or dance  
 
131. Lucy Johnston-Walsh & Megan M. Riesmeyer, A Practitioner’s Guide To New Developments in 
Pennsylvania’s Child Protection Law, 86 PA. B.A. Q. 59 (2015) (discussing the changes to Pennsylvania’s 
Child Protection Law). 
132. Changes to Pennsylvania’s Child Protective Services Law, supra note 130 (outlining the changes 
made effective in 2014 as a result of the Penn State saga). 
133. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6311 (2014); see also MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND 
NEGLECT, supra note 125, at 2 (detailing the state statutes for reporting child abuse and neglect and noting 
that most states only require some people in certain professions to report child abuse and neglect).   
134. See MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra note 125, at 2. 
135. § 6311(a) (delineating the persons required to report child abuse). 
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companies).136  In addition to the new class of mandatory reporters, the revised 
law clarified some of the old category of reporters.  For example, “school  
employees” now included staff at all public, private, and community colleges, 
in addition to K-12 schools.137  Some jurisdictions even began requiring every 
adult who had “regular contact” with a child to report any form of suspected 
abuse.138  Some states extended the law to require reports by any person who 
suspected child abuse or neglect.139  The legislation reflected public outrage that 
several individuals at Penn State, who could have made a difference and  
prevented the continuing abuse, failed to directly report Jerry Sandusky to  
authorities.  More specifically, many people believed that several Penn State 
officials, including coaches Joe Paterno and Mike McQueary, should have been 
required to directly report the abuse to the authorities, rather than merely passing 
the information onto supervisors and allowing only an internal investigation to 
occur.   
D. What is Filing a Report?  To Whom? 
In addition to expanding the rules regarding who was required to file a  
report, the revised Pennsylvania law provided clearer rules for filing a report 
and to whom the report needed to be filed.  Prior to the changes, Pennsylvania’s 
 
136. Id.; Who Are Mandated Reporters?, PA. FAM. SUPPORT ALLIANCE, http://www.pa-fsa.org/Man-
dated-Reporters/Understanding-Mandated-Reporting/Who-are-Mandated-Reporters (last visited July 30, 
2018) (“Mandated reporters generally are people who come into contact with children as a part of their  
employment, practice of their profession and, sometimes, as volunteers in child-serving programs”).   
137. Who Are Mandated Reporters?, supra note 136. 
Effective December 31, 2014, these people are considered mandated reporters under Penn-
sylvania Law: School employee (someone who is employed by the school or who provides 
a program, activity or service sponsored by a school). This includes youth camp/program, 
a recreational camp or program; sports or athletic program, outreach program, enrichment 
program and a troop, club or similar organization . . . . 
138. MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra note 125, at 2. 
139. Id. (noting that eighteen states now require reports by any person who suspects child abuse or  
neglect).  Some states, like Texas, now require anyone with knowledge of suspected child abuse or neglect to 
report it to the appropriate authorities.  Id.  This mandatory reporting applies to all individuals and is not 
limited by profession (e.g., teachers, health care workers, etc.) and even extends to individuals whose personal 
communications might be otherwise privileged, such as attorneys and clergy members.  TEX. FAM. CODE § 
261.101 (2018).  Section 261.101 mandates that anyone who suspects child abuse or neglect must immediately 
report it to (1) any local or state law enforcement agency, or (2) the Department of Family and Protective 
Services.  § 261.103.  Thus, the report must be made to an agency charged with expertise in child abuse and 
merely reporting the incident to a supervisor or manager is insufficient.  In addition, Texas law broadly defines 
“abuse” and “neglect” so that every action in which a child’s physical or mental health or welfare has been or 
may be adversely affected is potentially covered.  § 261.001(1), (4).  Furthermore, a person acting in good 
faith who reports or assists in the investigation of a report of child abuse or neglect is immune from civil or 
criminal liability, section 261.106(a), but failure to report suspected child abuse or neglect is a Class A  
Misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment of up to one year and/or a fine of up to $4,000.00.  See § 261.109. 
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law, like the law in many states, allowed educators who were aware of possible 
abuse to report it only to their workplace supervisors.140  Under the Pennsylvania 
law in effect at the time of the Sandusky incident, coach Joe Paterno (and even 
graduate assistant coach Mike McQueary) both reported the possible child rape 
to their superiors and therefore probably complied with their legal statutory 
duty.141  The old law then arguably required coach Paterno’s bosses to report 
the alleged abuse to law enforcement officials, and only those supervisors (AD 
Tim Curley and University VP Gary Schultz) faced charges for failing to notify 
police about the suspected abuse by Sandusky.142  To rectify the loophole of the 
problem merely being “passed up the chain of command,” Pennsylvania’s  
revised law now requires all reports to be made to the state’s ChildLine hotline, 
rather than leaving it to the supervisors to report.143  The hotline specialists then 
route the report to the appropriate child welfare or police agency for  
 
140. Leonard G. Brown III & Kevin Gallagher, Mandatory Reporting of Abuse: A Historical Perspective 
on the Evolution of States’ Current Mandatory Reporting Laws with a Review of the Laws in the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania, 59 VILL. L. REV. TOLLE LEGE 37 (2014). See Nirvi Shah, Penn State Scandal Shines 
Light on Child-Abuse Reporting Laws, EDUC. WEEK, Nov. 16, 2011, https://www.edweek.org/ew/arti-
cles/2011/11/16/13abuse.h31.html; Panel Recommends Changes to Pa. Hot Line for Reporting Child Abuse, 
WHYY, https://whyy.org/articles/panel-recommends-changes-to-pa-hotline-for-reporting-child-abuse/ (last 
visited July 30, 2018).   
141. Brown III & Gallagher, supra note 140.  
142. Id.  
143. § 6313 (delineating the basis for filing a report); What Are a Mandated Reporters Responsibilities?, 
PA. FAM. SUPPORT ALLIANCE, http://www.pa-fsa.org/Mandated-Reporters/Understanding-Mandated-Report-
ing/What-are-a-Mandated-Reporters-Responsibilities (last visited July 30, 2018). 
Mandated reporters are required to make a report of suspected abuse when they have  
reasonable cause to suspect that a child is a victim of child abuse under any of the following 
circumstances: 
They have contact with the child as part of work or through a regularly scheduled  
program activity or service OR 
They are responsible for the child or work for an agency that is directly responsible for 
the child OR 
Someone makes a specific disclosure to the mandated reporter and the child is  
identifiable.  This includes children that the mandated reporter may not know through 
their work or volunteer position OR 
A person 14 years old or older makes a disclosure that he/she has committee child 
abuse.  This includes children that the mandated reporter may not know through their 
work or volunteer position. 
The child does NOT have to come before the mandated reporter in order for the  
mandated reporter to make a report of suspected child abuse. 
Mandated reporters must not try to determine whether abuse has happened. They are 
not investigators and should not ask questions about what happened, who did it, and so 
forth beyond reaching the threshold of reasonable cause to suspect that the child has 
been abused. 
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investigation.144  Thus, the duty to file a report is now only fulfilled when the 
extended list of mandatory reporters go outside their institutions and file a report 
with an agency possessing special expertise in deciphering the validity of such 
reports.145 
Under this portion of Pennsylvania’s revised law, when former Penn State 
graduate assistant football coach Mike McQueary observed the shower-room 
incident, he would have been required to report the conduct directly to an  
outside authority with expertise, instead of reporting it to university officials, 
who were subsequently implicated in failing to further the investigation.   
Likewise, coach Joe Paterno, upon learning about the incident, would have been 
required to file a report with an agency with special expertise for these incidents.  
Thus, Pennsylvania’s revised mandatory reporter law now requires a direct  
report to the hotline specialist, rather than just passing of information on to  
immediate supervisors.  These safeguards might have led to Sandusky’s arrest 
ten or more years earlier. 
E. When Must a Report Be Filed? 
Another issue in mandatory reporting laws involves when a report must be 
filed.  In other words, how much evidence of abuse was needed to trigger the 
legal duty to report?  In many instances, individuals have claimed their failure 
to report resulted from a lack of concrete evidence of abuse and uncertainty 
about when a report was required to be filed.  In the Penn State scenario,  
graduate assistant coach McQueary seemed confused about whether he needed 
to report.  The revised Pennsylvania law triggers a duty to file a report whenever 
a mandatory reporter has “reasonable cause” to suspect child abuse because the 
reporter either directly observed suspected abuse or received a credible  
second-hand report with an identifiable victim.146  The report must be made  
immediately and include the victim’s identity, the nature and extent of the  
suspected abuse, the name and relationship of the suspect (to the victim), and 
 
144. § 6313. 
145. Id.; Reporting Child Abuse, PA. FAM. SUPPORT ALLIANCE, http://www.pa-fsa.org/Mandated-Re-
porters/Understanding-Mandated-Reporting/Making-a-Report (last visited July 30, 2018). 
To fulfill his legal mandate, when a mandated reporter has reasonable cause to suspect that 
a child is being abused, he must immediately make the report.  This can now be done in 
two ways:  
(1) Call ChildLine at 1-800-932-0313 . . . .  ChildLine is available 24 hours/ 7 days a 
week.  As a mandated reporter, you must provide your name and contact information 
when making the call.  After making the call, mandated reporters must follow up with 
an electronic report or a written report completed on the CY-47 form within 48 hours 
of making the oral report.  (2) Submit the report electronically. 
146. What Are a Mandated Reporters Responsibilities?, supra note 143. 
SOLOMON - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/4/18  6:21 PM 
410 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 28:2 
the source of the information if from a second-hand source.147  By clarifying 
when a report must be filed and the precise information required in the report, 
the mandatory reporter now has better information on what must be done and 
higher quality reports are likely to be filed.  Importantly, the mandatory reporter 
does not have to determine whether abuse occurred.   
The revisions to the Pennsylvania law were designed to avoid cases from 
“falling through the cracks.”  These revisions tried to ensure that people report 
their suspicions and avoid thinking that more evidence is needed before filing a 
report.  At Penn State, both McQueary and Paterno would have been required 
to file a report to child protective experts.  Thus, the revised law tries to ensure 
that professional experts assess these situations, and determine whether a child 
needs help and whether criminal behavior has occurred.   
F. Penalties for Failure to Report 
The revised Pennsylvania law also increased the penalty for failure to  
report, but also ensured that reporters received protection for reports, made in 
good faith, that turned out to be erroneous.148  The revised Pennsylvania law 
also increased the penalties for the willful failure to report for mandated  
reporters who had reasonable suspicion of abuse and decided not to report it.  
The first offense is a second-degree misdemeanor and becomes a third-degree 
felony for multiple offenses, but the penalties also increase to a third-degree 
felony if the mandated reporter fails to report child abuse that is a first-degree 
felony of which the mandated reporter has direct knowledge.149  Finally, the 
revised law also expanded immunity from liability and protection from  
 
147. § 6313(b). 
148. § 6319(a) (delineating the penalties for failure to report). 
149. Id.; Penalties for Willful Failure to Report Child Abuse, PA. FAM. SUPPORT ALLIANCE, 
http://www.pa-fsa.org/Mandated-Reporters/Understanding-Mandated-Reporting/Penalties-for-Failing-to-
Report (last visited July 30, 2018). 
Willful failure to report (having a reasonable suspicion of abuse and deciding not to report 
it) may be punished.  The penalties for failure to report have been increased under the new 
CPSL amendments.  The first offense of willful failure to report is a second degree  
misdemeanor.  Penalties are increased to a third degree felony if the mandated reporter 
willfully fails to report child abuse that is a felony of the first degree or higher and the 
mandated reporter has direct knowledge of the nature of the abuse.  For multiple offenses, 
a felony of the third degree is committed, increasing if the abuse of the child is a felony of 
the first degree or higher.  If willful failure to report continues, while the mandated reporter 
knows or has reasonable cause to believe the child is being actively abused, the offense is 
considered a first degree misdemeanor except when the abuse to the child constitutes a 
felony of the first degree or higher.  In this instance the penalty is a felony of the third 
degree. 
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employment discrimination because of making a report.150  More specifically, 
any mandated reporter who acted in good faith in making a report is shielded 
from both civil and criminal liability, and good faith is assumed.151 
G. Federal Law – Reporting Requirements – Title IX 
Although Pennsylvania’s revised state law might have helped to ensure the 
reporting of the conduct at Penn State and possibly prevented years of abuse, 
most state reporting laws only apply to conduct involving minors, which makes 
them largely inapplicable to the situation at Baylor and other college  
campuses.  For that reason, Title IX152 has become the preferred legal  
recourse for trying to impose accountability on universities for failures with re-
spect to campus sexual violence.153  Title IX was originally passed in 1972 as 
 
150. §§ 6318, 6320 (delineating immunity from liability and protection from employment  
discrimination); Protection for Mandated Reporters, PA. FAM. SUPPORT ALLIANCE, http://www.pa-
fsa.org/Mandated-Reporters/Understanding-Mandated-Reporting/Protection-for-Mandated-Reporters (last 
visited July 30, 2018) (“The amendments to the CPSL have expanded immunity from liability for reporting 
general protective services cases and testifying in proceedings as a result of the general protective services 
report.  Also, mandated reporters may not be the victims of employment discrimination because they have 
made a report.”).  
151. Protection for Mandated Reporters, supra note 150. 
All persons are protected from civil and criminal liability if acting in good faith when  
reporting, cooperating and consulting in investigations, testifying in proceedings as a result 
of the report, taking photographs, arranging for medical tests and x-rays, taking a child into 
protective custody (as allowed under the CPSL) and admitting a child to a private or public 
hospital.  The good faith of a mandated reporter is assumed. 
152. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2018). 
153. In addition to Title IX, educational institutions have a legal obligation to report suspected abuse 
under two other federal statutes: (1) The Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus 
Crimes Statistics Act of 1991 (Clery Act), 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f) (1991) and (2) the Campus Sexual Violence 
Elimination Act of 2013 (SaVE Act), which is embedded within the 2013 reauthorization of 1994’s Violence 
Against Women Act.  Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 304, 127 
Stat. 89 (2013).  The Clery Act was originally called the Crime Awareness and Campus Security Act and was 
promulgated in 1990.  Jeremy D. Heacox, S-A: Clery Act Responsibilities for Reporting Allegations of  
Peer-on-Peer Sexual Assaults Committed by Student-Athletes, 10 WILLAMETTE SPORTS L.J. 48, 51 (2012).  It  
requires colleges to report crimes that occur on campus and was named after Jeanne Clery, a student at Lehigh 
University who was raped and murdered in her dorm room in 1985.  Id.  Her parents discovered that students 
had not been told about dozens of violent crimes that had taken place on campus in the three years before her 
murder, and lobbied Congress for enhanced reporting requirements.  Id.  “The primary purpose of the Clery 
Act was to increase transparency around campus crime so that prospective students and their parents could 
make more knowledgeable decisions about which schools to attend.”  Nancy Chi Cantalupo,  
‘Decriminalizing’ Campus Institutional Responses to Peer Sexual Violence, 38 J.C. & U.L. 481, 511 (2012) 
(citing H.R. REP. NO. H11499-01, at 1 (1990) (Conf. Rep.) (statement of Rep. Gooding).  In 2013, Congress 
passed the SaVE Act which built on and clarified Title IX obligations of colleges and universities to protect 
abuse victims.  Jill C. Engle, Mandatory Reporting of Campus Sexual Assault and Domestic Violence: Moving 
to a Victim-Centric Protocol that Comports with Federal Law, 24 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 401, 404 (2015).  
The SaVE Act called for increased transparency regarding the frequency of campus violence.  Id.  More 
SOLOMON - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/4/18  6:21 PM 
412 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 28:2 
an amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and hailed as a landmark federal 
civil right because it opened educational doors to women and prohibited  
discrimination based on sex.154  Until recently, it was probably best known for 
ensuring equal opportunities and funding for women in high school and college 
athletics, which had been lacking until required by Title IX regulations.  More 
recently, because of the 2011 “Dear Colleague Letter” issued by the Department 
of Education, Title IX has become a tool for fighting unchecked sexual violence 
at educational institutions and it now prohibits gender discrimination and sexual 
harassment by any educational institution that receives federal funds.155   
The  “Dear Colleague Letter” issued by the Office for Civil Rights of the 
Department of Education to educational institutions recognized that sexual  
harassment, which included sexual violence, was “a form of sex discrimination 
prohibited by Title IX.”156  After proclaiming that sexual violence, which  
included sexual assault, sexual battery, sexual harassment, and sexual coercion, 
constituted discrimination under Title IX, the “Dear Colleague Letter” noted 
that such sexual violence was both pervasive and under-reported.157  In an effort 
to combat the discrimination stemming from sexual violence on campuses and 
 
specifically, the SaVE Act requires institutions to collect statistics from a broad range of campus officials 
including resident advisors, deans, athletic coaches, campus police or security, and local law enforcement.  Id. 
154. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).  Title IX reads: “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”  Id.  Thus, by its terms, the law prohibited  
educational programs that receive federal funding, which is the vast majority of schools (from elementary 
schools to colleges), from discriminating based on sex. 
155. Russlynn Ali, Acting Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter, OFF. FOR CIV. 
RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Apr. 4, 2011), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-
201104.pdf (recognizing that “Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 
et seq., and its implementing regulations, 34 C.F.R. Part 106, prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex in 
education programs or activities operated by recipients of Federal financial assistance.”). 
156. Id.  The letter defined sexual violence as “physical sexual acts perpetrated against a person’s will or 
where a person is incapable of giving consent due to the victim’s use of drugs or alcohol,” including “sexual 
assault, sexual battery, and sexual coercion,” and required colleges and universities “to take immediate and 
effective steps to end sexual harassment and sexual violence.”  Id. 
157. For example, recent data shows nearly 4,000 reported incidents of sexual battery other than rape and 
800 reported rapes and attempted rapes occurring in our nation’s public high schools.  SIMONE ROBERS ET 
AL., INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY: 2010, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 104 (Nov. 2010), 
https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2011/2011002.pdf.  Indeed, by the time girls graduate from high school, more than 
one in ten will have been physically forced to have sexual intercourse in or out of school.  DANICE K. EATON 
ET AL., YOUTH RISK BEHAVIOR SURVEILLANCE 2009, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT (2010) 
available at https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss5905a1.htm#tab12.  When young women get 
to college, nearly 20% of them will be victims of attempted or actual sexual assault, as will about 6% of 
undergraduate men.  CHRISTOPHER P. KREBS ET AL., THE CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT (CSA) STUDY, NAT’L 
INST. OF JUSTICE, 5-3, 5-5 (Dec. 2007), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/221153.pdf; see Russlynn 
Ali, Acting Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter: Sexual Violence Background,  
Summary, and Fast Facts, OFF. FOR CIV. RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Apr. 4, 2011), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/dcl-factsheet-201104.pdf. 
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comply with Title IX, the “Dear Colleague” Letter required schools to take the 
following actions: 
• Once a school knows or reasonably should know of possible 
sexual violence, it must take immediate and appropriate action 
to investigate or otherwise determine what occurred.    
• If sexual violence has occurred, a school must take prompt and 
effective steps to end the sexual violence, prevent its  
recurrence, and address its effects, whether or not the sexual 
violence is the subject of a criminal investigation. 
• A school must take steps to protect the complainant as  
necessary, including interim steps taken prior to the final  
outcome of the investigation. 
• A school must provide a grievance procedure for students to 
file complaints of sex discrimination, including complaints of 
sexual violence. These procedures must include an equal  
opportunity for both parties to present witnesses and other  
evidence and the same appeal rights. 
• A school’s grievance procedures must use the preponderance 
of the evidence standard to resolve complaints of sex  
discrimination. 
• A school must notify both parties of the outcome of the  
complaint.158 
These new Title IX requirements dramatically altered the compliance  
obligations on educational institutions and subsequently resulted in the filing of 
numerous Title IX lawsuits against universities for noncompliance.   
Additionally, in Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ.,159 the United States  
Supreme Court had already held that educational institutions could be liable for 
damages if the institution is deliberately indifferent to known, severe, pervasive, 
and objectively offensive sexual harassment that deprives the victim of access 
to educational opportunities.160  Not surprisingly, seven Title IX suits have been 
filed against Baylor and the scope of the allegations in these lawsuits is chilling.  
Baylor’s Board of Regents has admitted that seventeen women have accused 
nineteen Baylor football players of sexual assault—including four gang rape 
 
158. Russlynn Ali, supra note 157. 
159. 526 U.S. 629, 648–50 (1999). 
160. Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648-50 (1999). 
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allegations—since 2011.161  The allegations in the lawsuits claim that the  
number of players involved and the number of rapes is even higher. 
The first Title IX action brought against Baylor alleged that university  
officials had been “deliberately indifferent to complaints by student victims of 
rape” by athletes on the Baylor campus.162  The rape victim’s mother alleged 
that Baylor “was not helpful in guiding her daughter during this academically 
stressful time,” and that the victim even lost her scholarship following the  
assault.163  Other rape victims filed Title IX lawsuits alleging that Baylor “knew 
about previous sexual assault allegations against [football player] Elliott and 
failed to take proper action to protect other students.”164  These women also 
claim that Baylor failed to timely hire a Title IX coordinator to oversee and 
handle such complaints.165  According to the attorney who filed the Title IX 
action, “[r]ather than following the law intended to protect victims like our  
client, Baylor failed to investigate these allegations, allowed Elliott to remain a 
threat to other female students and did nothing to offer any counseling or  
academic support, which ultimately forced her to drop out of Baylor.”166 
One of the scarier allegations alleges that Baylor’s chief judicial officer, 
Bethany McCraw, told one of the sexual assault victims (“Jane Roe”) that she 
was the sixth female to report being sexually assaulted by football player  
Elliott.167  Baylor’s chief judicial officer then told Roe “there was nothing the 
school could do for Roe unless there was a court determination that Elliott had 
indeed raped Roe” because otherwise “it would come down to a  
 
161. Brad Reagan, Baylor Regents Found Alleged Sexual Assaults by Football Players ‘Horrifying’, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2016, https://www.wsj.com/articles/baylor-details-horrifying-alleged-sexual-assaults-
by-football-players-1477681988. 
162. Tommy Witherspoon, Former Baylor Student to File Lawsuit Over School’s Handling of Elliott 
Sexual Assault, WACO TRIB.-HERALD, Mar. 30, 2016, http://www.wacotrib.com/former-baylor-student-to-
file-lawsuit-over-school-s-handling/article_ff8d1ba1-394b-52b3-909e-cdad7a40a43e.html. 
163. Solis, supra note 57. 
164. Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 60; Ambrose & Tarrant, supra note 60;  
Witherspoon, supra note 60. 
165. Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 60. 
166. Witherspoon, supra note 60. 
167. Second Amended Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 61.   
At this meeting, McCraw informed Roe that there was nothing McCraw could do in  
response to Roe’s complaint that she had been raped by Elliott.  McCraw also told Roe and 
her mother that Roe was the sixth female student to come in to McCraw’s office to report 
that they had been sexually assaulted by Elliott.  Roe and her mother asked if Briles knew 
of these reports, to which McCraw responded that Briles was aware of the reports. McCraw 
told Roe and her mother that there was nothing the school could do for Roe unless there 
was a court determination that Elliott had indeed raped Roe.  Otherwise, McCraw said, it 
would come down to a “he said-she said” situation, and the school could not act on it. 
Id.; Witherspoon, supra note 60. 
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‘he-said-she-said’ situation, and the school could not act on it.”168  McCraw also 
told Roe that head football coach Art Briles was aware of the reports.169  The 
lawsuit also alleges that the rape victim’s mother and father both contacted 
coach Briles’ office multiple times and received a call that Briles was “looking 
into” the matter.170  Finally, according to the complaint, the rape victim notified 
and received little, if any, help from Baylor’s Academic Services Department, 
Counseling Center, or psychology department at Baylor’s Student Health  
Center.171 
Even more recently, another Title IX lawsuit against Baylor alleges even 
more widespread problems including at least fifty-two acts of rape by thirty-one 
Baylor football players from 2011-2014.172  The complaint alleges that football 
players participated in five gang rapes, two of which involved ten or more play-
ers at the same time.173  The suit also alleges that players videotaped and shared 
the recordings with their teammates and that coaches created a “culture of sex-
ual violence” by encouraging female students in the Baylor Bruins hostess pro-
gram to have sex with recruits and players.174 It also alleges that Baylor  
enticed a student athletic trainer, who had accused a football player of rape, to 
sign a non-disclosure agreement in exchange for Baylor paying for her  
education.175 These latest allegations surpass Baylor’s own admission that 19 
football players had committed acts of sexual or domestic violence from 2011-
16.176 
In the most recent and seventh Title IX suit filed in May of 2017, even more 
disturbing details emerged.  The complaint alleges that football team had a  
system of drugging and gang raping freshman females, and photographing and 
 
168. Witherspoon, supra note 60. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
172. Elizabeth Doe vs. Baylor University, WASH. POST, http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/docu-
ments/sports/elizabeth-doe-vs-baylor-university/2309/ (last visited July 30, 2018); Sarah Mervosh, New  
Baylor Lawsuit Alleges 52 Rapes by Football Players in 4 years, ‘Show Em a Good Time’ Culture, DALL. 
MORNING NEWS, Jan. 27, 2017, https://www.dallasnews.com/news/baylor/2017/01/27/new-baylor-lawsuit-
describes-show-em-good-time-culture-cites-52-rapes-football-players-4-years; Will Hobson, Lawsuit Alleges 
Baylor Football Rape Scandal More Widespread Than Reported, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2017, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/lawsuit-alleges-baylor-football-rape-scandal-more-wide-
spread-than-reported/2017/01/27/38e93d3e-e4e0-11e6-a547 
5fb9411d332c_story.html?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.d9e56d5befc2. 
173. Elizabeth Doe vs. Baylor University, supra note 172. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
176. Reagan, supra note 161. 
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videotaping the sexual assaults and rapes.177  The suit also alleges that the  
players then harassed the sexual assault victims through text messages, and that 
the university never accommodated or properly counseled the victims who  
reported sexual assaults.178   
In addition to the seven Title IX lawsuits brought against Baylor, the last 
two Title IX compliance officers at Baylor have filed complaints with the  
Department of Education.  The first Title IX officer claimed that she was  
intimidated from fully investigating sexual assault cases, involving football 
players.  More recently, the Title IX officer claimed that Baylor violated Title 
IX provisions even after the school supposedly implemented changes  
recommended by the Baylor Board of Regents.  As a result, the U.S. Department 
of Education launched a Title IX investigation into how Baylor has dealt with 
sexual violence on its campus.179 
Unfortunately, Baylor University is not the only institution under  
investigation for potential Title IX violations because of their deliberate  
indifference to sexual assault complaints.  Over three-hundred institutions are 
currently facing federal Title IX inquiries concerning their handling of sex  
assault allegations.180  In 2016, the University of Tennessee settled a Title IX 
lawsuit for $2.48 million.181  The lawsuit stemmed from sexual and physical 
assaults by student athletes reported by eight female students between 2013 and 
2015, and accused the University of permitting a culture of sexual assault to 
thrive on its campus of 27,845 students.182  The Title IX complaint also alleged 
that the university’s administrative hearing process was one-sided and “denie[d] 
victims the rights to a hearing and to the same equal procedural, hearing, and 
 
177. Phillip Ericksen, Baylor Hit with 7th Title IX Lawsuit, Plaintiff Alleges Gang Rape by Football 
Players, WACO TRIB.-HERALD, May 17, 2017, http://www.wacotrib.com/news/courts_and_trials/baylor-hit-
with-th-title-ix-lawsuit-plaintiff-alleges-gang/article_1b391c59-1722-5532-9c3b-058b07850249.html. 
According to the suit, the football team had a system of hazing freshman recruits by having 
them bring freshman females to parties to be drugged and gang-raped, “or in the words of 
the football players, ‘trains’ would be run on the girls.”  Considered a bonding experience 
by the players, according to the suit, the rapes also were photographed and videotaped, and 
the plaintiff confirmed that at least one 21-second videotape of two Baylor students being 
gang- raped by football players had circulated. 
178. Id. 
179. Tom Steele, Baylor Faces Title IX Investigation Over Its Handling of Sexual Assault On Campus, 
DALL. MORNING NEWS, Oct. 19, 2016, https://www.dallasnews.com/news/higher-education/2016/10/19/bay-
lor-faces-title-ix-investigation-handling-sexual-assault-campus. 
180. Tyler Kingkade, There Are Far More Title IX Investigations of Colleges Than Most People Know, 
HUFFINGTON POST, June 16, 2016, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/title-ix-investigations-sexual-har-
assment_us_575f4b0ee4b053d433061b3d. 
181. Steve Almasy & Khushbu Shah, University of Tennessee Settles Title IX Lawsuit, CNN (July 5, 
2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/05/us/tennessee-title-ix-lawsuit/. 
182. Id. 
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process rights as given to perpetrators of rape and sexual assault,” and accused 
the university of providing lawyers for students accused of misconduct and  
interfering with investigations.183  The case was settled only after the plaintiffs 
were satisfied that the university made significant progress in sexual assault  
prevention education and the way in which the school responded to assault 
claims, which included the hiring of six more people in Title IX compliance 
positions.184  According to the attorney for the plaintiffs, “[m]y clients and I are 
also convinced that the university’s leadership is truly committed to continue its  
exemplary efforts to create a model as it relates to sexual misconduct.”185   
Although the settlement agreement did not admit guilt, negligence, or that laws 
were broken, University of Tennessee Chancellor Jimmy G. Cheek said, “[l]ike 
many institutions we are not perfect, but our goal is to continue to be the best 
we can be at creating awareness, educating and preventing discrimination and 
abuse in any form, and to continue to be equally prepared when it does happen 
and to deal with it promptly, sensitively, fairly and effectively,” and that 
“[w]e’ve come a long way in recent years, and we are working every day to be 
even better.”186 
III. THE NCAA’S ROLE 
In addition to the possibility that state and federal law can help address and 
possibly curb the problems seen at Penn State, Baylor and other universities, the 
NCAA, as the governing body for college athletics, can probably best address 
these issues. Prior to the Penn State scandal, NCAA  
President Mark Emmert had indicated a willingness to punish rule-breakers  
severely, indicating that the infractions committee should make the harshest 
penalties an option including using the “death penalty” as a deterrent.187   
According to Emmert, in unique circumstances and rare cases, “TV bans and 
death penalties [may be] warranted . . . [and shouldn’t be] off the table.”188   
Despite Emmert’s comments, the NCAA has probably been hesitant to impose 
the death penalty, especially because of the consequences that resulted from the  
imposition of the death penalty at Southern Methodist University (“SMU”).  In 
the 20 years after the resumption of football at SMU after the death penalty, the 
 
183. Id. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
186. Id.  
187. Associated Press, NCAA President Mark Emmert Says Death Penalty an Option to Punish  
Rule-Breakers, ESPN (Aug 19, 2011), http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/6877907/ncaa-presi-
dent-mark-emmert-says-death-penalty-option-punish-rule-breakers. 
188. Id.  
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school posted only one winning record and did not reach another bowl game for 
decades (until 2009).189  It is also widely believed that the death penalty played 
a role in the breakup and then dissolution of the Southwest Conference.  Former 
SMU football coach Phil Bennett once described the NCAA “death penalty” as 
like an “atomic bomb” because “[t]he NCAA did it one time and created  
devastation beyond belief—and it’s never going to be done again.”190 
A. The NCAA & PSU 
On November 17, 2011, less than two weeks after the indictment and arrest 
of Jerry Sandusky, the NCAA notified Penn State that it would face an NCAA 
investigation.191  According to NCAA President Mark Emmert’s letter to Penn 
State, the NCAA was going to “examine Penn State’s exercise of institutional 
control over its intercollegiate athletics program” because the Sandusky grand 
jury indictment alleged that serial sexual abuse occurred in the university’s  
athletic facilities and Penn State officials may have failed to take proper action 
despite their knowledge of this behavior.192  The NCAA specifically noted that 
“individuals who were in a position to monitor and act upon learning of potential 
abuses” appear to have acted in a way that was “starkly contrary to the values 
of higher education, as well as the NCAA.”193  The NCAA set forth several 
constitutional and bylaw provisions that may have been violated: 
• a failure to meet the NCAA’s standards for institutional control 
and responsibility, and ethical conduct, and specifically Penn 
State’s responsibility to oversee that “the actions of its staff 
members and for the actions of any individual or organization 
engaged in activities promoting the athletics interests of the 
university” (para. 2) (Articles 2.1, 6.01.1, and 6.4), 
• a failure to promote “civility in society” and “adhere to such 
fundamental values as respect, fairness, civility, honesty, and 
responsibility” that should be manifested “in the broad  
 
189. Id.  
190. Tim Layden, The Loneliest Losers, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED: VAULT, Nov. 18, 2002, 
https://www.si.com/vault/2002/11/18/8116719/the-loneliest-losers-fifteen-years-ago-smus-powerhouse-
football-program-was-obliterated-by-a-pay-for-play-scandal-and-the-ncaas-first-quotdeath-penaltyquot-
since-then-20-other-college-programs--including-alabama-football-this-y (explaining that since the NCAA 
enforced its “death penalty” sanction against Southern Methodist University, “20 other college programs . . . 
have qualified for the ultimate sanction, but all have been spared” and that was written more than ten years 
ago). 
191. Letter from Mark A. Emmert, President, NCAA, to Rodney Erickson, President, Pa. St. Univ. (Nov. 
17, 2011) (on file with Pennsylvania State University), available at http://www.psu.edu/ur/2011/NCAA.pdf. 
192. Id. 
193. Id.   
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spectrum of activities affecting the athletics program” (para. 2) 
(Article 2.4), 
• engaging in unethical conduct through deceit and dishonesty, 
and “behavior that endangers young people” (para. 3) (NCAA 
Bylaw 10.1 & 11.1.1), 
• a failure by the head coach “to promote an atmosphere for  
compliance within the program” and “monitor the compliance 
of all assistant coaches and other administrators involved with 
the program who report directly or indirectly to the head coach” 
(para. 3) (NCAA Bylaw 11.1.2.1), and 
• failures by individuals associated with the athletics program to 
meet the “ethical expectations of the NCAA membership” by 
engaging in “improper conduct or questionable acts” and  
failing to set an example of high “moral values” (para. 4) 
(NCAA Bylaw 19.01.2).194 
The NCAA ultimately agreed to Penn State’s request that the NCAA defer 
further action until Penn State completed its own extensive investigation and 
shared its findings with the NCAA.195 
Less than one year later, in July 2012, shortly after Penn State publicly  
released the Freeh Report and several months after Sandusky’s conviction, 
NCAA President Emmert informed Penn State that the NCAA’s Board of  
Directors (which historically had no role in rules enforcement) wanted to  
“unilaterally impose”196 the “death penalty” on PSU’s football program, which 
would have completely shut down the football program for multiple years.197  
Interestingly, before threatening Penn State with the death penalty, the NCAA 
did not launch its own investigation or go through the disciplinary procedures 
via the “Committee on Infractions” as stipulated in its bylaws.198  Instead, the 
NCAA informed Penn State that the findings of the Freeh Report proved an 
extraordinary institutional failure that justified direct action by the Board of  
Directors and the possible imposition of the death penalty.  Perhaps even more 
interestingly, even the NCAA’s “Committee on Infractions, which is  
empowered to identify . . . rules violations and determine . . . disciplinary  
 
194. Id.  
195. Don Van Natta Jr., Inside the Secret Negotiations That Brought Penn State Football to the Brink of 
Extinction, ESPN (Aug. 4, 2012), http://www.espn.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/8228641/inside-secret-negotia-
tions-brought-penn-state-football-brink-extinction. 
196. Matthew Mitten, The Penn State “Consent Decree”: The NCAA’s Coercive Means Don’t Justify Its 
Laud-able Ends, but is There a Legal Remedy?, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 321, 326 (2014). 
197. Van Natta Jr., supra note 195.  
198. Mitten, supra note 196.  
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sanctions,”199 seemingly did not have the “explicit authority to impose [the] 
[death penalty] . . . because [Penn State’s] athletic programs had [not] been . . 
guilty of a major NCAA rules violation within the preceding five-year  
period,”200 which is a prerequisite to the death penalty.201 
Less than one week after the NCAA informally threatened Penn State with 
the death penalty, Penn State accepted a Binding Consent Decree, a plea  
agreement between the university and the NCAA.202  To avoid the death penalty, 
Penn State agreed to the following penalties203: 
• [a] $60 million fine (the program’s gross annual income) . . . to 
be paid over a five-year period . . . into an endowment for  
programs preventing child sexual abuse and/or assisting the 
victims of child sexual abuse, 
• [a] four-year postseason ban, 
• a limit of 15 initial grants-in-aid for four years, 
• [f]ive years of probation, 
• vacat[ing] all wins [112] of the Penn State football team from 
1998-2011 (which meant that Coach Paterno would no longer 
be college football’s winningest coach), and 
• [agreeing] to adopt all [117] recommendations . . . in Chapter 
10 of the Freeh Report.204 
 
199. Id.  
200. Id.  NCAA Bylaws “permit[] the ‘death penalty,’ which prohibits an institution from participating 
in an intercollegiate sport for a designated period of time, to be imposed only on “repeat violators” (i.e., 
institutions found guilty of a “major violation” within the past five years).”  Id. at 326 n.37; see Enforcement 
Process: Penalties, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/enforcement/enforcement-process-penalties (last visited 
July 30, 2018).  “A ‘major violation’ is defined as a violation other than one “that is isolated or inadvertent in 
nature, provides or is intended to provide only a minimal recruiting, competitive or other advantage and does 
not include any significant recruiting inducement or extra benefit.”  Id. at 327 n.37.   
Th[e] [death] [penalty] has been imposed only five times, generally in extreme cases in 
which an institution has committed intentional, severe, and repeated major violations 
demonstrating clear disregard for NCAA rules: University of Kentucky (no men’s  
basketball during 1952–1953 season); University of Southwestern Louisiana (no men’s 
basketball during 1973–1974 and 1974–1975 seasons); Southern Methodist University (no 
football during 1987–1988 season); Morehouse College (no men’s soccer during  
2003–2004, 2004–2005, and 2005–2006 seasons); and MacMurray College (no men’s  
tennis during 2005–2006 and 2006–2007 seasons).  
201. Enforcement Process: Penalties, supra note 200.  
202. Mitten, supra note 196, at 327.  
203. Id.  
204. RODNEY A. ERICKSON & MARK A. EMMERT, BINDING CONSENT DECREE IMPOSED BY THE 
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION AND ACCEPTED BY THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE 
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According to the Consent Decree, Penn State acknowledged that the  
findings of the Freeh Report established that Penn State violated the NCAA 
principles, bylaws, and rules referenced in the NCAA’s original letter from 
NCAA President Emmert on November 17, 2011, agreed that a “traditional  
investigative and administrative proceedings would be duplicative and  
unnecessary,”205 and waived its rights “to a determination of violations by the 
NCAA Committee on Infractions, any appeal under NCAA rules, and any  
judicial process.”206  Thus, the NCAA used its “de facto ‘best interests’ power 
to punish a member university for individual criminal activity and institutional 
misconduct”207 that might not have been “actionable by the NCAA”208 and Penn 
State seemingly agreed to these penalties to avoid the “death penalty.”209 
On the day of the agreement,  
Dr. Edward J. Ray, the chair of the NCAA Executive  
Committee and president of Oregon State University, stated 
that the “historically unprecedented actions by the NCAA  
today are warranted by the conspiracy of silence that was  
maintained at the highest levels of the university in reckless and 
callous disregard for the children.”210   
He explained further that “[t]he [NCAA] Executive Committee ha[d] the 
authority to act on behalf of the entire Association in extraordinary  
circumstances” and had “chosen to exercise that authority.”211  As the basis of 
authority, the NCAA subsequently cited “Bylaw 4.1.2(e), which states that the 
Executive Committee is authorized to ‘[a]ct on behalf of the Association by 
adopting and implementing policies to resolve core issues and other  
Association-wide matters.’”212  Although Ray stated this was not an  
unprecedented exercise of this authority, the Executive Committee had never 
used this power to impose disciplinary sanctions for NCAA rules violations.213  
NCAA President Emmert added,  
 
UNIVERSITY, NCAA, 5–6 (2012), https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/Binding%20Consent%20De-
cree.pdf. 
205. Id. at 1. 
206. Id. at 2. 
207. Mitten, supra note 196, at 322. 
208. Id. 
209. RODNEY A. ERICKSON & MARK A. EMMERT, supra note 204, at 4. 
210. Mitten, supra note 196, at 328-29. 
211. Id. at 329. 
212. Id. at 329 n.46; see NCAA Authority to Act, NCAA (July 23, 2012), http://www.ncaa.org/about/re-
sources/media-center/news/ncaa-authority-act. 
213. Mitten, supra note 196, at 329 n.46. 
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This was and is action by the Executive Committee exercising 
their [sic] authority, working with me to correct what was seen 
as a horrifically egregious situation in intercollegiate athletics  
. . . .  [O]ne should not conclude that this was an abridged  
enforcement process.  It was completely different than an  
enforcement process.214 
Shortly after Penn State entered into the consent decree, Pennsylvania State 
Senator Jake Corman, who represented the county that is home to Penn State 
and was the chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee, became annoyed 
that Penn State’s $60 million NCAA fine was going to a national, rather than a  
Pennsylvania, child abuse foundation.215  According to Senator Corman, “if 
there’s any money that’s going to be spent by the university, it’s going to be 
spent in Pennsylvania.”216  With Senator Corman’s urging, the Pennsylvania 
Legislature passed the “Higher Education Monetary Penalty Endowment Act” 
(Endowment Act) which mandated that any penalties paid by state–funded  
institutions of higher education would remain in-state.217  Shortly after the  
passage of the Endowment Act, a lawsuit was initiated to force Penn State’s $60 
million NCAA sanction to be paid within the state of Pennsylvania.218 
The lawsuit was originally filed to force the NCAA’s penalty sanction to be 
spent on child sexual abuse prevention organizations in Pennsylvania rather 
than national organizations, but it “gradually became a referendum on the 
NCAA’s authority to impose sanctions in the first place.”219  During pre-trial 
discovery, Penn State discovered several internal NCAA emails that questioned 
the NCAA’s authority to discipline Penn State without going through its normal 
disciplinary procedures via the Committee on Infractions as stipulated in its 
 
214. Mitten, supra note 196, at 329. 
215. Jack Holmes, How Penn State Beat The Sandusky Rap, DAILY BEAST (Jan. 31, 2015), 
https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-penn-state-beat-the-sandusky-rap. 
216. Id.  
217. Id. 
218. Meghan Garrity, Corman/McCord v. NCAA Postponed, Daily Collegian, Dec. 18, 2014, 
https://www.collegian.psu.edu/news/crime_courts/article_fc3d3b4e-8715-11e4-b153-3b70484a505e.html.  
The NCAA had countersued, alleging that the law was unconstitutional.  Rachel Axon, Plaintiffs Gain  
Leverage Over NCAA in Penn State Lawsuit, USA TODAY, Jan. 13, 2015, https://www.usato-
day.com/story/sports/college/2015/01/13/penn-state-ncaa-joe-paterno-lawsuit-consent-decree/21723591/. 
219. Jake New, NCAA Restores Penn State’s Wins Under Paterno, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 19, 2015), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2015/01/19/ncaa-restores-penn-states-wins-under-paterno; see 
NCAA Reaches Proposed Settlement in Corman Lawsuit, NCAA (Jan. 16, 2015), 
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/ncaa-reaches-proposed-settlement-corman-lawsuit 
(noting that “[t]he lawsuit originally asked the judge to restrict the distribution of the $60 million fine to child 
sexual abuse prevention organizations in Pennsylvania rather than national organizations . . . [but] expanded 
. . . to include the NCAA’s authority to act in this matter . . . .”). 
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bylaws.220  In one email, Kevin Lennon, NCAA Vice President of Academic 
and Membership Affairs, seemingly admitted that the NCAA did not have a 
well-developed rationale for why the NCAA’s Executive Committee had the 
jurisdiction to act alone, rather than via the Committee on Infractions.221   
Another email seemed to indicate that NCAA executives were unsure whether 
the NCAA’s Executive Committee could unilaterally sanction Penn State  
without following its bylaws, but believed that Penn State would agree to the 
terms because of the university’s black-eye from the scandal.222  Thus, top-level 
NCAA executives seemingly recognized that its bylaws might only allow the 
Committee on Infractions to punish Penn State, but chose to pursue an  
alternative course of action.223 
Furthermore, deposition testimony revealed that NCAA President Mark 
Emmert threatened Penn State with the death penalty even though such penalty 
was unlikely.224  Emmert told Penn State’s President that “he had read the Freeh 
Report from beginning to end twice over the weekend, and many of the  
presidents [on the executive committee] had as well,” and that  
everyone viewed this as the worst scandal ever in sports . . . .  
He said the presidents want blood.  He said they would like to 
shut your program down for multiple years; never seen them so 
angry and upset . . . .  He thought the only way to head this off 
would be to craft a package of what he said would be very, very 
severe sanctions; that he might -- he emphasized “might” -- be 
willing to get the [NCAA’s] boards to look favorably upon, but 
that time was of the essence and that confidentiality was of the 
essence.225   
 
220. Sen. Jake Corman’s Response to NCAA’s Supplemental “Statement” Regarding Documents Still in 
Dispute, Corman v. NCAA, No. 1 MD 2013 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014), http://www.pacourts.us/assets/files/set-
ting-4002/file-3999.pdf?cb=23623d. 
221. See Jake New, NCAA Had Doubts on Its Authority in Penn State Case, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Nov. 6, 
2014), https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2014/11/06/ncaa-had-doubts-its-authority-penn-state-
case. 
222. Sen. Jake Corman Response to NCAA’s Supplemental “Statement” Regarding Documents Still in 
Dispute, supra note 220, Exhibit B.  Julie Roe Lach, the NCAA’s Vice President of Enforcement, wrote in an 
email that: 
I characterized our approach to PSU as a bluff when talking to Mark [Emmert] yesterday 
afternoon after the call.  He basically agreed b/c I think he understands that if we make this 
an enforcement issue, we may win the immediate battle but lose the war when the  
[Committee on Infractions] has to rule.  I think he is okay with that risk. 
223. Id. 
224. Deposition of Rodney Erickson, Corman v. NCAA, No. 1 MD 2013 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014), 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/files/setting-4002/file-4141.pdf?cb=2b6ef2. 
225. Id. at 39–41. 
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Essentially, the NCAA President was threatening Penn State with the death 
penalty, stating that the NCAA’s executive board would handle the case, and 
not letting it go through the usual disciplinary channels via the Committee on 
Infractions.  According to Penn State’s President, the university was not given 
the choice to go through the Committee on Infractions and the normal  
disciplinary procedures that would have allowed Penn State to defend itself  
before a verdict.226  Penn State was essentially told to either accept the NCAA’s 
proposed agreement or risk losing its football program.227  Edward Ray, who 
was the chairperson of the NCAA Executive Committee at the time of the  
Consent Decree, later admitted that death penalty was never going to happen.  
Ray said, “talk of the death penalty for Penn State never gathered strong support 
. . . . [and] the committee discussed such a severe penalty twice—coming to no 
consensus the first time and voting against it overwhelmingly four days later.”228  
Ray could “not remember the vote outcome, ‘but if you told me it was 19 to 2, 
I would believe you.’”229 
In 2014, during the course of the litigation and possibly fearing a loss in 
court, the NCAA reduced Penn State’s postseason and scholarship penalties  
after the university made progress implementing changes outlined by an  
independent athletics integrity monitor.230  In January 2015, before trial, the 
NCAA agreed to settle the lawsuit and remove most of the remaining sanctions 
that had been placed on PSU.231  The settlement left in place Penn State’s $60 
million fine payable “to activities and programs for the prevention of child  
sexual abuse and the treatment of victims of child sexual abuse,” but restored 
112 football wins that had been stripped from Penn State thereby reinstating Joe 
 
226. Id. at 43–45. 
227. See ESPN News Services, Penn State Nittany Lions Hit with $60 Million Fine, 4-Year Bowl Ban, 
Wins Dating to 1998, ESPN (July 24, 2012), http://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/8191027/penn-
state-nittany-lions-hit-60-million-fine-4-year-bowl-ban-wins-dating-1998.  Penn State’s President Rodney 
Erickson told the Centre Daily Times that “[w]e had our backs to the wall on this” and Erickson told ESPN 
that “[t]he alternative was far worse. The death [penalty] was a possibility . . . .  I thought it was better to go 
down this path than face a multi-year penalty.”  Id. 
228. Rachel Axon & Erik Brady, Did Penn State Really Face the Death Penalty?, USA TODAY, Jan. 15, 
2015, https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2015/01/15/penn-state-ncaa-mark-emmert-death-pen-
alty-consent-decree-rodney-erickson/21826697/. 
229. Id. 
230. NCAA Reaches Proposed Settlement in Corman Lawsuit, supra note 219 (noting that “[t]he NCAA 
Executive Committee restored postseason access and the full complement of scholarships in 2014, based on 
the recommendation from Athletics Integrity Monitor Sen. George Mitchell in response to the university’s 
progress.”).  See Adam Rittenberg, NCAA President Mark Emmert Praises Success of Penn State Nittany 
Lions, ESPN (Dec. 7, 2016), http://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/18227258/ncaa-president-
mark-emmert-praises-success-penn-state-nittany-lions. 
231. NCAA Reaches Proposed Settlement in Corman Lawsuit, supra note 219. 
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Paterno as the winningest coach in major college football history.232  In settling 
the litigation, the NCAA did not officially back down on its authority to act and 
“Penn State acknowledge[d] the NCAA’s legitimate and good faith interest and 
concern regarding the Jerry Sandusky matter.”233  According to one member of 
the NCAA Board of Governors, the settlement “with Penn State reaffirms our  
authority to act . . . .  [And that] the NCAA has a legitimate role when a  
member’s actions threaten the integrity of college sports.”234  Furthermore, 
“[c]ontinuing this litigation would [have] further delay[ed] the distribution of 
funds to child sexual abuse survivors for years, undermining the very intent of 
the fine.”235  Thus, although the NCAA originally threatened Penn State with 
the death penalty and got agreement to severe sanctions, the NCAA ultimately 
significantly rescinded or lessened these penalties.   
Briefly, the NCAA backed down in the Penn State case because it was 
seemingly uncertain that it had the power, based on its rules and bylaws, to  
punish Penn State.  It also seemingly had ignored proper protocol by involving 
the Board of Directors, rather than the Committee on Infractions.  Interestingly, 
the NCAA has been reluctant to formally address the Baylor situation, even 
though Baylor officials seemingly admitted institutional failure to properly  
respond to sexual assaults committed by numerous football players.   
IV. SOLUTIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the clearest example that the Penn State and Baylor scandals have not 
caused any significant or meaningful change in the investigatory or reporting 
practices within athletic departments, Michigan State University (and USA 
Gymnastics) recently became embroiled in a scandal that had unfortunate  
similarities to both Penn State and Baylor.  The Michigan State scandal involved 
the sexual abuse of both under-aged and college-aged female athletes, and a 
deliberate indifference by Michigan State officials to the university’s female 
students.  In January 2018, Dr. Larry Nassar, who was the team physician for 
Michigan State University and USA Gymnastics, was sentenced to 40-175 years 
in prison after pleading guilty to sexually assaulting as many as 265 women, 
many of whom were under-age girls, many of whom were Michigan State  
University female student-athletes, and several of whom were prominent female 
Olympic gymnasts.236  Dr. Nassar committed these sexual assaults by inserting 
 
232. Id.   
233. Id.   
234. Id.   
235. Id.   
236. Tracy Connor, Larry Nassar Accuser Count is Up to 265, Judge Says, NBC NEWS, Jan. 31, 2018, 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/larry-nassar-accuser-count-265-judge-says-n843316. 
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his fingers into the vaginas and anuses of his female victims while claiming that 
he was performing legitimate medical procedures and providing treatment for 
injuries.237   
Dr. Nassar’s abuse occurred over a period of approximately twenty years, 
and continued to occur despite complaints that were either silenced or ignored 
for seventeen years.  “In the Nassar case, campus police and Michigan State’s 
Title IX office did not formally begin investigating him [Nassar] until 2014—
17 years after the first complaint was made to a Michigan State coach.”238  Even 
when an investigation occurred in 2014, one of the experts evaluating Nassar’s 
conduct was his close friend and protégé, and the investigation inexplicably  
exonerated Nassar while also placing guidelines on his treatment of future  
patients, guidelines that he never followed.239  Subsequent to the 2014  
investigation and before Nassar’s indictment in 2016, Nassar sexually assaulted 
at least a dozen additional women and young girls.240   
More recently, reports show that Michigan State’s indifference went beyond 
its inaction against Dr. Nassar and was widespread throughout its athletic  
department.  An outside investigation found “a pattern of widespread denial, 
inaction and information suppression of such allegations by officials ranging 
from campus police to the Spartan athletic department.”241  The investigation 
detailed abuses in Michigan State’s football and basketball program, including 
instances of alleged sexual assaults and violence against women that were never 
reported to the proper authorities and instead “were routinely investigated and 
handled by AD [Mark] Hollis’ department, and sometimes even coaches.”242  
The investigation found “a number of cases involving football and basketball 
players that had never reached the light of day, that had never been reported.”243  
 
237. Emily Lawler, What Was Portrayed as Medical Treatment, Alleged Victims Claim is Sexual Assault, 
MLIVE, Mar. 1, 2017, http://www.mlive.com/news/index.ssf/2017/02/what_was_portrayed_as_medi-
cal.html; Roni Caryn Rabin, Pelvic Massage Can Be Legitimate, But Not in Larry Nassar’s Hands, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 31, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/31/well/live/pelvic-massage-can-be-legitimate-but-
not-in-larry-nassars-hands.html. 
238. Paula Lavigne & Nicole Noren, Pattern of Denial, Inaction, Information Suppression at Michigan 
State Goes Beyond Larry Nassar Case, ESPN (Feb. 1, 2018), 
http://www.espn.com/espn/story/_/id/22214566/pattern-denial-inaction-information-suppression-michigan-
state-goes-larry-nassar-case-espn (“As far back as 1997, athletes began telling multiple MSU officials,  
including the university’s longtime gymnastics coach, that Nassar was assaulting them under the guise of 
medical treatment.”). 
239. Id.   
240. Id.   
241. Id.   
242. Id.   
243. Richard Deitsch, ESPN’s Paula Lavigne Talks MSU Sexual Abuse Scandal, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, 
Feb. 4, 2018, https://www.si.com/tech-media/2018/02/04/espn-paula-lavigne-outside-lines-michigan-state-
sexual-assault-scandal. 
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According to Lauren Allswede, who spent seven years at Michigan State as a 
sexual assault counselor, 
Whatever protocol or policy was in place, whatever front-line 
staff might normally be involved in response or investigation, 
it all got kind of swept away and it was handled more by  
administration [and] athletic department officials . . . .  It was 
all happening behind closed doors . . . None of it was  
transparent or included people who would normally be  
involved in certain decisions.244   
Ultimately, the investigation “uncovered numerous cases where the  
university apparently knew of but did little about accusations of sexual assaults 
committed by its athletes.”245 
Similar to what happened at Penn State and Baylor, the scandal ultimately 
resulted in the resignations of Michigan State University President Lou Anna 
Simon, AD Mark Hollis, and gymnastics coach Kathie Klages (who was made 
aware of sexual abuse allegations against Nassar as early as 1997).246   
Furthermore, more than 150 women are now suing Nassar, Michigan State  
University, USA Gymnastics, and other entities, and Michigan State’s potential 
liability may top $1 billion.247  Finally, the NCAA recently sent a letter of  
inquiry to Michigan State requesting the self-reporting of any possible NCAA 
violations related to Dr. Nassar’s assaults against girls and young women,  
including student-athletes at Michigan State.248  The NCAA specifically cited 
Article 2.2 of its constitution which “establishes the principle of protecting  
student-athlete well-being, including health and safety, and Bylaw 20.9.1.6  
specifically identifies well-being as an imperative for Division 1 members.”249  
It further noted, “Larry Nassar’s heinous crimes of record against more than 150 
victims raise serious concerns about institutional practices, student-athlete 
safety and the institution’s actions to protect individuals from his behavior.”250 
 
244. Grace Bird, Michigan State, NCAA Under Fire Over Sex Assault Cases, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 29, 
2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/01/29/michigan-state-ncaa-under-fire-over-sex-assault-
cases. 
245. Id.   
246. Lavigne & Noren, supra note 238. 
247. Nolan Finley, Finley: Cost to MSU of Gymnast Abuse Scandal Could Top $1B, DETROIT NEWS, 
Dec. 2, 2017, http://www.detroitnews.com/story/opinion/columnists/nolan-finley/2017/12/02/cost-msu-gym-
nast-scandal/108247652/. 
248. Letter from Oliver F. Luck, Exec. Vice President, NCAA, to Mark Hollis, Athletics Dir., Michigan 
State University (Jan. 23, 2018) (on file with Michigan State University), available at https://www.document-
cloud.org/documents/4358981-NCAA-Letter-to-Michigan-State.html. 
249. Id.   
250. Id.   
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Not surprisingly, the Michigan State scandal has drawn comparisons to both 
Penn State and Baylor because, once again, athletic department and even  
university officials failed to respond and even ignored warning signs about 
crimes being committed on campus.  Once again, these officials seemed more 
committed to protecting the reputation of the prestigious athletic program and 
university than ensuring the safety and well-being of students and others on 
campus.  Although there are no easy answers to these recurring problems,  
several possible measures must be considered, including changes to state and 
federal laws, changes to the NCAA’s bylaws and enforcement policies, and 
changes to university and athletic department policies.   
In response to the Penn State scandal, many state legislatures made several 
changes to its mandatory reporter laws—laws that are designed to protect the 
most vulnerable victims and ensure the reporting of possible child abuse.  As 
detailed earlier, Pennsylvania’s legislature enacted many changes and a  
reexamination of Michigan law has already begun because of the Michigan 
State scandal.  These changes are designed to strengthen the state’s mandatory 
reporter laws by ensuring that suspected problems are promptly reported and 
investigated.  Most people agree that the best way to ensure reporting is to  
expand the list of people who are required to report (i.e., mandatory reporters).  
Mandatory reporters had typically only been people who have frequent contact 
with children (e.g., social workers, teachers, principals, other school personnel, 
doctors, nurses, other health-care workers, counselors, therapists, and other 
mental health professionals, childcare providers, and law enforcement  
officers).251  The logic is that certain professionals (i.e., individuals who  
encounter children and may recognize or suspect abuse) should have a duty to 
report these allegations to law enforcement.  In several states, including under 
Pennsylvania’s revised law, mandatory reporters now include faculty,  
administrators, athletics staff, and other employees and volunteers at institutions 
of higher learning, including public and private colleges and universities and 
vocational and technical schools.252  After Penn State, a few states (not including 
Michigan or Pennsylvania) required anyone with direct knowledge of abuse to 
be required to report (i.e. everyone was made a mandatory reporter).253  At the 
very least, states should re-examine and carefully scrutinize who should be a 
mandatory reporter.   
In addition to re-evaluating who should be a mandatory reporter, states 
should re-examine the scope of the reporter’s duty.  Under many mandatory 
reporter laws, mandatory reporters only have the legal obligation to report the 
 
251. MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra note 125, at 2. 
252. § 6311. 
253. MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra note 125, at 30-31, 46-47. 
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suspected abuse to a superior at work (or to a designated person at the  
workplace) and do not have a duty to directly report the problematic conduct to 
the police or other state agency.  This has led to problems in many cases,  
including at Penn State, where reports were made to supervisors but the  
information never reached child protection agencies.  As a result, legislators 
should consider changing mandatory reporting laws so that mandatory reporters 
are required to report suspected child abuse directly to either the police or a 
child protection agency.  Pennsylvania’s revised law requires such direct  
reporting to child protective services.254  Direct reporting to the police or child 
protection agencies prevents the “passing the story down the line” effect that 
seemingly occurred in the Penn State situation when employees passed reports 
“up the chain of command” and from one party to another party, but never to 
law enforcement or child protection agencies.  Finally, the mandatory reporting 
laws need to lower the standard for required reporting, and include tougher  
penalties for failure to report and immunity for “good faith” reporting that turns 
out to be untrue.  By making these changes, some of the problems at Penn State 
and Michigan State could have been uncovered sooner and further problems 
avoided.   
Another possible solution to these problems would be to enact a federal law 
that would provide a uniform national standard for reporting suspected sexual 
abuse.  A uniform national standard would eliminate the inconsistencies  
currently found in the patchwork of differing state laws.  After the Penn State 
scandal, Pennsylvania Senator Casey Jr. unsuccessfully introduced federal  
legislation that would have require all adults—not just mandated reporters—to 
report suspected child abuse and neglect to child protection agencies or law  
enforcement.  Despite this earlier failure, in light of the Michigan State and USA 
Gymnastics scandal, Congress recently passed considering a bill, entitled the 
“Protecting Young Victims from Sexual Abuse and Safe Sport Authorization 
Act,” which applies to amateur sports groups, such as USA Gymnastics, and 
other sports organizations that participate in interstate and international 
travel.255  The Act aims to fix a patchwork of state reporting rules by requiring 
adults who interact with amateur athletes to report suspected child and sexual 
abuse within 24 hours to local law enforcement.256  The Act could be extended 
beyond amateur athletics. 
In addition to changes to state and federal law, the NCAA has the ability to 
more effectively prevent similar problems on college campuses by  
 
254. § 6313. 
255. Protecting Young Victims from Sexual Abuse and Safe Sport Authorization Act of 2017 (S. 534), 
GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/s534 (last visited July 30, 2018). 
256. Id.  
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strengthening its enforcement policies and bylaws pertaining to unethical  
conduct and institutional control.257  By strengthening its enforcement and  
bylaws, member schools would have notice that the NCAA had the authority to 
investigate and impose harsh discipline in such cases, including the imposition 
of the death penalty.  By explicitly changing its bylaws to make clear that the 
NCAA had the authority to investigate and discipline for institutional failures 
such as those that occurred at Penn State and Baylor and Michigan State, the 
NCAA would alleviate questions and concerns that lingered after Penn State 
about whether the NCAA had the authority to impose such penalties. 
Finally, either the NCAA or universities must consider completely relieving 
coaches and athletic department personnel from their roles in the investigation 
and disciplining of any player for any off-the-field incident.  For too long, 
coaches and athletic department staff have been directly involved in both the 
investigation and disciplinary decisions regarding their players.  The Baylor, 
Penn State, and now Michigan State scandals are direct proof that coaches (and 
athletic department personnel) should not be a part of the disciplinary process 
in any manner.  Over and over, these scandals have proven that coaches (and 
athletic department personnel) are prone to protecting the school’s or team’s 
“brand” and giving the benefit of the doubt to those involved with building that 
brand.  Because of the nature of major collegiate athletics, coaches (and athletic 
department staff) simply have too much to win or lose when their players are 
involved in off-the-field incidents.  By excluding coaches from the disciplinary 
process, the student-athletes will know that no favoritism will occur, that  
uniform standards for student conduct will apply, and that their coach will not 
be an ally fighting for reduced punishment for their off-the-field indiscretions.  
Schools need policies mandating that any off-the-field incident, whether  
relatively minor or possibly criminal, needs to be immediately turned over to an 
independent university panel specifically tasked with handling such matters and 
imposing discipline. 
Schools also need to establish a culture of open communication that  
encourages reporting of any misconduct and a zero-tolerance policy against  
retaliation or backlash for people making such reports.  The situation at Baylor, 
where women who filed sexual assault complaints were retaliated against in 
several ways, can never be permitted or repeated.  One idea, implemented into 
law in Minnesota, requires colleges to have websites that allow students to  
 
257. NCAA, 2017–18 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 10, 10.1, at 45 (Aug. 1, 2017).  NCAA Bylaw 10.1 
deals with unethical conduct and could be expanded to explicitly cover ethical lapses that occurred at Penn 
State, Baylor, and Michigan State.  Id.  Furthermore, NCAA Bylaw 20.9.1.5 deals with the commitment to 
institutional control and compliance, and could be explicitly expanded to cover the institutional failures at 
Penn State, Baylor, and Michigan State.  NCAA, 2017–18 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 20, 20.9.1.5, at 
360 (Aug. 1, 2017). 
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report incidents of sexual assault online and anonymously, which will hopefully 
reduce the fear that comes with reporting an assault.258 
The athletic departments must also fully comply with university and Title 
IX policies that require any domestic violence incident to be reported  
immediately to the Title IX office, a university office dedicated to objectively 
examining claims of harassment and discrimination based on gender.  In  
essence, universities must eliminate the “old way of handling things” and the 
mindset of “sitting down and working things out” and excusing bad behavior as 
a “good kid doing a dumb thing.”  Universities must be fully committed to  
ending the culture of indifference and inaction.  Some states, like Illinois, have 
even passed laws mandating that colleges create a detailed policy for responding 
to reports of sexual assault and requiring the submission of data, on an annual 
basis, to the State’s Attorney General’s Office.259 
Another possibility is to mandate institutional oversight not only for  
off-the-field incidents, but also for the recruiting for prospective  
student-athletes with prior disciplinary or criminal histories or even all recruits.  
This institutional oversight could occur at the university, conference, or NCAA 
level.  When it comes to recruiting, coaches are inherently biased; they both 
want and need the best athletes to win.  As a result, if a player is very talented, 
coaches will routinely downplay (or even disregard) a player’s history of sexual 
assault allegations or other problems.  To fix this problem, institutional  
oversight is needed so that coaches do not have the final decision on potentially 
problematic prospective student-athletes, including transfers, who have  
significant disciplinary or criminal histories.  The individual schools or  
conferences or the NCAA need to implement policies that result in a full and 
independent investigation, including detailed background checks, for any prob-
lematic prospective student-athlete.260  Under such a policy, before any  
prospective student-athlete with a prior record of serious disciplinary or  
criminal conduct is allowed onto campus, an independent panel, without any 
linkage to the school’s athletic department, would need to investigate, review 
 
258. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 135A.15 (Subd. 5) (2017).   
Online reporting system.  (a) A postsecondary institution must provide an online reporting 
system to receive complaints of sexual harassment and sexual violence from students and 
employees.  The system must permit anonymous reports, provided that the institution is not 
obligated to investigate an anonymous report unless a formal report is submitted through 
the process established in the institution’s sexual harassment and sexual violence policy. 
259. Preventing Sexual Violence in Higher Education Act, 110 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 155 (2017). 
260. See Cody Stavenhagen, Criminal Background Checks Remain a Rarity Despite Issues in College 
Sports, TULSA WORLD (Jan. 28, 2017), http://www.tulsaworld.com/sportsextra/collegefootball/criminal-
background-checks-remain-a-rarity-despite-issues-in-college/article_09416217-f22c-560e-8bea-
484ba787ca84.html (noting that only a few schools nationwide run detailed background checks on every  
prospective athlete). 
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the prior problems, and approve the student’s admission onto campus.  Not  
surprisingly, after the Baylor scandal where a transfer student-athlete with  
significant prior abuse problems was admitted onto campus and subsequently 
committed a campus rape, the Big 12 conference enacted a “Serious Misconduct 
Policy” for prospective student-athletes.261  According to the policy,  
“[p]rospective student-athletes, including transfers, who have committed  
serious misconduct shall not be eligible for athletically related financial aid, 
practice or competition.”262  Although “[t]he Big 12 le[ft] the exact definition 
of serious misconduct up to the individual schools, but [it] mandate[d] that it 
must include ‘sexual assault, domestic violence and other similar crimes  
involving moral turpitude.’”263 
In 2016, the University of Oklahoma instituted one of the strictest policies 
for vetting its prospective student-athletes.  Under that policy, the compliance 
office, an entity that directly reports to the university’s general counsel office 
and not the athletic department, conducts a detailed background and social  
media check on all prospective student-athletes.264  If deemed necessary, the 
compliance office uses investigators and private detectives to track down  
follow-up information.  The compliance office then creates a robust profile on 
each prospective student-athlete.  Any potential problems are flagged for review 
by the university’s general counsel and president, who ultimately decide 
whether the prospective student-athlete is admitted into the university.  These 
steps can ensure that the university properly vets each prospective  
student-athlete and that the investigatory and decision-making process is free 
from the bias inherent within the athletic department.  All schools, conferences, 
and even the NCAA should consider implementing a similar policy.  By taking 
all of the steps recommended in this section, which include improving both the 
laws and the institutional oversight and regulation provided by the NCAA, the 
conferences, and the universities themselves, universities can hopefully prevent 
future recurrences of the horrors and cover-ups at Penn State, Baylor, and  
Michigan State, provide better protection for students, and help to avoid  
liability. 
 
 
261. Brooke Pryor, Oklahoma Works to Fine-Tune Background Check System, OKLAHOMAN, Jan. 31, 
2017, http://newsok.com/article/5536058. 
262. Id. 
263. Id. 
264. Before signing letters of intent with the university, the athletes are required to submit a background 
check “authorization form” which details the recruit’s personal information including date of birth, social 
security number, and driver’s license number.  Id.  
